St. Mary's Journal on Legal Malpractice &
Ethics
Volume 11

Number 2

Article 4

10-6-2021

The Informed Consent Doctrine in Legal Malpractice Law
Vincent R. Johnson
St. Mary's University School of Law, vjohnson@stmarytx.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/lmej
Part of the Civil Law Commons, Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons, Legal
Profession Commons, Legal Remedies Commons, and the Litigation Commons

Recommended Citation
Vincent R. Johnson, The Informed Consent Doctrine in Legal Malpractice Law, 11 ST. MARY'S J. ON LEGAL
MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 362 (2021).
Available at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/lmej/vol11/iss2/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the St. Mary's Law Journals at Digital Commons at St.
Mary's University. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. Mary's Journal on Legal Malpractice & Ethics by an
authorized editor of Digital Commons at St. Mary's University. For more information, please contact
sfowler@stmarytx.edu.

ARTICLE
Vincent R. Johnson
The Informed Consent Doctrine in Legal Malpractice Law
Abstract. The doctrine of informed consent is now deeply embedded into
the law of legal ethics. In legal malpractice litigation, the doctrine holds that a
lawyer has a duty to disclose to a client material information about the risks and
alternatives associated with a course of action. A lawyer who fails to make such
required disclosures and fails to obtain informed consent is negligent, regardless
of whether the lawyer otherwise exercises care in representing a client. If such
negligent nondisclosures cause damages, the lawyer can be held accountable for
the client’s losses.
Shifting the focus of a legal malpractice action from garden-variety
negligence (such as ignorance of the law, late filing of a complaint, or failure to
safeguard client funds or data) to a lack of informed consent can potentially
transform a losing case into a winner. Among other things, the doctrine has
the potential to simplify and clarify the plaintiff’s argument, which may be
especially useful if the case is tried to a jury. The informed consent doctrine
also makes sense as a matter of public policy, because clients have a right to
control important matters related to their representation.
This Article explores the informed consent doctrine in legal malpractice law.
It discusses the rise of the informed consent doctrine in medical malpractice
law and traces the transplantation of the language and principles of informed
consent, first, into the law of lawyer discipline, and then into the law of lawyer
civil liability. The Article explores what the relevant legal malpractice case law
says about the obligation to obtain informed consent. Finally, the Article
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addresses certain pivotal issues in the operation of the informed consent
doctrine in claims by clients against lawyers, including the nature of lawyer
disclosure obligations, the limits imposed by the scope of the representation,
the role of expert testimony, and the standard for proving factual causation.
Author. Professor Vincent Johnson is a South Texas Distinguished
Professor of Law at St. Mary’s University, San Antonio, Texas. He earned his
B.A. and LL.D. from St. Vincent College; his J.D. from the University of Notre
Dame; an LL.M. from Yale University; and an LL.M. from the London School
of Economics and Political Science.
Professor Johnson’s books have been taught at more than forty American
law schools. By appointment of the Texas Supreme Court, he is now serving a
second three-year term on the Committee for Disciplinary Rules and Referenda.
That group plays a key role in formulating proposed changes to the Texas
Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct. In 2019–2020, Professor Johnson
was interim dean of St. Mary’s University School of Law.
Professor Johnson thanks Ross Harold Potter, Jr., a student at St. Mary’s
University School of Law, whose tenacious research greatly aided the
preparation of this Article.
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I. INTRODUCTION
There are many ways for a plaintiff to lose a legal malpractice case, even
if the defendant-lawyer grievously erred. A claim may fail due to lack of
privity;1 or expert testimony;2 or insufficient evidence of factual causation3
or damages;4 or due to defenses based on untimely filing5 or unlawful
conduct;6 or for many other reasons.7
Representing a plaintiff asserting a legal malpractice claim is not for the
timid or the unprepared. Indeed, the doctrinal and procedural obstacles to
recovery facing victims of lawyer negligence are so numerous and so potent,
one might suspect the deck is stacked against them.8
In contrast, the rules that make it easier for legal malpractice plaintiffs to
recover are few and far between. In rare cases, plaintiffs do not need to
adduce expert testimony;9 or the burden of proof on causation is shifted to
the defendant;10 or a business transaction between a lawyer and client is

1. See Susan Saab Fortney & Vincent R. Johnson, Legal Malpractice § 5-4.1(a),
in LEGAL ETHICS, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 810, 810–11
(2018) [hereinafter Fortney & Johnson, Legal Malpractice] (discussing “[t]he [p]rivity [o]bstacle”).
2. See id. § 5-2.2(f)(1), at 752–53 (discussing the necessity of expert testimony “to [e]stablish the
[s]tandard of [c]are”).
3. See id. § 5-2.3(a), at 772 (discussing factual causation).
4. See id. § 5-5.1, at 851–53 (discussing compensatory damages).
5. See id. § 5-6.4(a), at 879 (discussing malpractice statutes of limitations).
6. See id. § 5-6.2(c), at 870–74 (discussing unlawful conduct); see also Vincent R. Johnson,
The Unlawful Conduct Defense in Legal Malpractice, 77 UMKC L. REV. 43, 45–46 (2008) (explaining modern
legal malpractice law currently recognizes the outlaw doctrine in various forms).
7. See, e.g., Vincent R. Johnson, Causation and “Legal Certainty” in Legal Malpractice Law,
8 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 374, 399–400 (2018) (citations omitted) (“Suits by
clients may flounder because the matter in question fell outside the scope of the representation,
involved a permissible exercise of lawyer discretion, or resulted in nothing more than the client’s ‘loss
of chance’ to secure a more favorable result.”).
8. Cf. Susan Saab Fortney, A Tort in Search of a Remedy: Prying Open the Courthouse Doors for Legal
Malpractice Victims, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2033, 2056 (2017) (“[I]t is time to reexamine whether our
civil liability regime provides meaningful remedies to numerous consumers injured by attorney
misconduct.”); Benjamin H. Barton, Do Judges Systematically Favor the Interests of the Legal Profession?,
59 ALA. L. REV. 453, 453 (2008) (“[M]any legal outcomes can be explained, and future cases predicted,
by asking a very simple question: is there a plausible legal result in this case that will significantly affect
the interests of the legal profession (positively or negatively)? If so, the case will be decided in the way
that offers the best result for the legal profession.”).
9. Fortney & Johnson, Legal Malpractice, supra note 1, § 5-2.2(f)(2), at 753 (discussing the
exception to the expert testimony requirement for obvious negligence).
10. Id. § 5-2.3(a)(5), at 780 (discussing “[s]hifting the [b]urden of [p]roof on [c]ausation”);
Jeffrie D. Boysen, Shifting the Burden of Proof on Causation in Legal Malpractice Actions, 1 ST. MARY’S J.
LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 308, 323–24 (2011) (discussing burden shifting in Louisiana).
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presumed to have been unfair.11 In the usual case, however, a legal
malpractice plaintiff faces obstacle after obstacle.
Against this sobering backdrop reflecting the realities of legal malpractice
litigation,12 an important doctrine has emerged that, in a broad range of
cases spanning more than forty years,13 makes it easier for legal malpractice
plaintiffs to recover damages by way of court judgments and private
settlements. The doctrine is the rule of informed consent. Now deeply
embedded into the law of legal ethics,14 the doctrine holds a lawyer has a
duty to disclose material information about the risks and alternatives
associated with a course of action, allowing the client to make informed
decisions related to their representation.15 Thus, in Sierra Fria Corp. v.
Donald J. Evans P.C.,16 the First Circuit wrote:

11. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE L. GOVERNING LAWS. § 126 cmt. e (AM. L. INST.
2000) (“Unintended overreaching is a possibility in transactions involving lawyers and their clients.
Accordingly a lawyer must overcome a presumption that overreaching occurred by demonstrating the
fairness of the transaction.”).
12. See generally Vincent R. Johnson, Legal Malpractice Claims: What the Data Indicate, 9 ST. MARY’S
J. LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 138, 145 (2018) (reviewing HERBERT M. KRITZER & NEIL
VIDMAR, WHEN LAWYERS SCREW UP: IMPROVING ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR LEGAL MALPRACTICE
VICTIMS (2018)) [hereinafter Johnson, Legal Malpractice Claims] (citations omitted) (“Only a small
fraction of LPL [lawyer professional liability] claims is brought by lawyers with substantial expertise in
this area[;] . . . [A] large percentage of LPL claims do[] not result in compensation being paid[.]”
(quoting Kritzer & Vidmar, supra, at 12, 62) (second, third, and fourth alterations in the original)).
13. See Mark Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the Legal Profession,
128 U. PA. L. REV. 41, 67 (1979) (citations omitted) (“Hornbook agency law states that the agent has
a duty to disclose all material information to his client.”); id. at 73 (“[A] lawyer should be affirmatively
required to obtain informed consent when client values or lawyer conflicts of interest are involved.”).
Professor Martyn stated long ago:
Clients have successfully alleged in malpractice suits, or as grounds for other relief, failure to
disclose information material to the client’s decision, failure to disclose conflicts of interest, and
failure to disclose an attorney’s opinion regarding the merits of a case. By creating an affirmative
duty to inform the client, these decisions permit the client to make an informed choice about the
next course of action.
Susan R. Martyn, Informed Consent in the Practice of Law, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 307, 330 (1980).
14. Fortney & Johnson, Legal Malpractice, supra note 1, § 5-2.2(n), at 769–70.
15. See id. (describing the meaning of “informed consent”); cf. Rice v. Downs, 203 Cal. Rptr. 3d
555, 569–70 (Cal. Ct. App. June 28, 2016) (holding a legal malpractice action based on failure to disclose
information and obtain informed consent with respect to actual and potential conflicts was not barred
by an arbitration clause); Lewellen v. Phillips, No. C062277, 2010 WL 4851362, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App.
Nov. 30, 2010) (finding evidence negated the plaintiff’s allegations that her lawyer “badgered her into
accepting the settlement agreement and failed to obtain her informed consent before it was executed”).
16. Sierra Fria Corp. v. Donald J. Evans, P.C.,127 F.3d 175 (1st Cir. 1997).
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[W]hen a client seeks advice from an attorney, the attorney owes the client “a
duty of full and fair disclosure of facts material to the client’s interests.” This
means that the attorney must advise the client of any significant legal risks
involved in a contemplated transaction, and must do so in terms sufficiently
plain to permit the client to assess both the risks and their potential impact on
his situation.17

A lawyer who fails to make such required disclosures and obtain informed
consent is negligent, regardless of whether the lawyer otherwise exercises
care in representing a client.18 If the negligent nondisclosures cause
damages, the lawyer can be held accountable for the client’s losses.19
There is a divergence of authority as to whether causation of damages is
assessed by use of a subjective test, an objective test, or some combination
thereof. That issue is discussed in detail near the end of this Article in
Part V.D. In other parts of this Article, such as quoted materials or
discussions referencing the decisions or opinions of other authorities,
readers should expect to encounter varying tests for proving whether a
nondisclosure of material information caused damages.
The Illinois Appellate Court explained the doctrine of informed consent
in the following terms:
[A]n attorney’s liability for failing to advise a client of the foreseeable risks
attendant to a given course of legal action is not predicated upon the
impropriety of the recommended course of action; rather, it is predicated
upon the client’s exposure to a risk that the client did not knowingly and
voluntarily assume. Consequently, to establish the element of proximate
cause, it is necessary for the client to both plead and prove that had the

17. Id. at 179–80 (citation omitted).
18. Cf. Metrick v. Chatz, 639 N.E.2d 198, 653–54 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (“If a client suffers damage
because of the happening of a foreseeable risk of which he or she was not informed, the attorney may
be liable. In such a case, the attorney's liability is not predicated upon the impropriety of the chosen
course of action, but rather upon the failure to inform the client sufficiently to enable him or her to
voluntarily accept the risk attendant thereto.”). But see Friedman v. Kahn, No. 1-12-0881, 2013 WL
6858452, at *12 (Ill. App. Ct. Dec. 27, 2013) (affirming, in relevant part, a judgment adverse to the
client in a legal malpractice action based on lack of informed consent where the trial court refused to
instruct the jury that “[i]f a lawyer fails to advise his clients regarding the foreseeable risk of a course
of action he advises the client to take, the lawyer is negligent regardless of the propriety of the course
of action the lawyer recommends”).
19. Cf. Frazee v. Proskauer Rose LLP, No. B254569, 2016 WL 6236400, at *1–2 (Cal. Ct. App.
Oct. 25, 2016) (affirming dismissal of legal malpractice claims based on failure to obtain informed
consent to the terms of a settlement because plaintiff failed to prove proximate causation of damages).
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undisclosed risk been known, he or she would not have accepted the risk and
consented to the recommended course of action.20

A jury instruction used in the state of Washington captures the key
features of the legal malpractice informed consent doctrine in the following
terms:
A lawyer has a duty to inform a client of all material facts, including risks and
alternatives, which a reasonably prudent client would need to make an
informed decision on whether to consent to or reject a proposed course of
action. A material fact is one to which a reasonably prudent person in a
position of a client would attach significan[ce] in deciding whether or not to
follow the proposed course of action.
A lawyer’s duty to properly advise and counsel the lawyer’s client in
accordance with the applicable standard of care cannot be delegated to
another person or entity.21

Shifting the focus of a legal malpractice action from garden-variety
negligence (e.g., ignorance of the law,22 late filing of a complaint,23 or
20. Metrick, 639 N.E.2d at 202.
21. Edleman v. Russell, No. 65668-6-I, 2012 WL 1501064, at *2–3 (refusing to review a
challenge to the jury instruction that was not adequately preserved). The last sentence of the instruction
presumably means not that the duty cannot be delegated, but rather that, if the duty is delegated and
misperformed, the lawyer who delegated the duty is responsible for the misperformance.
“[N]ondelegable duty arguments have been raised, and have sometimes succeeded, in legal malpractice
cases . . . .” Vincent R. Johnson & Stephen C. Loomis, Malpractice Liability Related to Foreign Outsourcing
of Legal Services, 2 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 262, 307–08 (2012) (footnotes
omitted); see also Fortney & Johnson, Legal Malpractice, supra note 1, § 5-7.3(f), at 925 (discussing
nondelegable duties); Kleeman v. Rheingold, 614 N.E.2d 712, 713–14, 718 (N.Y. 1993) (holding a law
firm had a nondelegable duty to its client to assure proper service of legal process); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE L. GOVERNING LAWS. § 122 cmt. c(i) (AM. L. INST. 2000) (“When several lawyers
represent the same client, responsibility to make disclosure and obtain informed consent may be
delegated to one or more of the lawyers who appears reasonably capable of providing adequate
information.”).
22. According to a recent study, 15.90% of legal malpractice claims involve failure to know or
properly apply the law. STANDING COMM. ON LAWS.’ PRO. LIAB., 2020–2021, AM. BAR ASS’N,
PROFILE OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS 2016–2019, at 22 (2020) [hereinafter PROFILE OF LEGAL
MALPRACTICE CLAIMS]. See generally Fortney & Johnson, Legal Malpractice, supra note 1, § 5-2.2(d)(1),
at 748 (noting the duty of “[c]ompetence entails many things, including . . . knowledge” of the
applicable law).
23. About 10% of legal malpractice cases relate to failure to properly calendar deadlines (7.40%)
or failure to react to calendared deadlines (2.54%). PROFILE OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS, supra
note 22, at 22. See generally Fortney & Johnson, Legal Malpractice, supra note 1, § 5-2.2(d)(3), at 749
(stating the duty of diligence “requires timely attention to the client’s affairs”).
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failure to safeguard client funds24 or data25) to a lack of informed consent
can potentially transform a losing case into a winner. Among other things,
the doctrine has the potential to simplify and clarify the plaintiff’s argument,
which may be especially useful if the case is tried to a jury.
Essentially, what the plaintiff needs to prove in a case alleging lack of
informed consent is that a certain fact was material26 and required to be
disclosed, that it was known to the defendant-lawyer but not disclosed by
the lawyer or otherwise known to the plaintiff, and that if the fact had been
disclosed the plaintiff would have chosen a different course and achieved a
more favorable result.27 These three factors—required disclosure, breach

24. See generally Gregory C. Sisk, Duties to Effectively Represent the Client § 4-5.6, in LEGAL ETHICS,
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 273, 297–303 (2018) (discussing
“The Duty to Safeguard Client Funds and Property”); see also Vincent R. Johnson, The Limited Duties of
Lawyers to Protect the Funds and Property of Nonclients, 8 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 58,
66 (2017) (“Any discussion of the duties of lawyers to protect the funds or property of third persons
must undoubtedly begin with the text of Rule 1.15 of the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of
Professional Conduct.”).
25. See Hiscox Ins. Co. v. Warden Grier, LLP, 474 F. Supp. 3d 1004, 1006 (W.D. Mo. 2020)
(discussing claims against a law firm involving failure to protect data based on contract, implied
contract, fiduciary duty, and negligence); Nell Gluckman & Christine Simmons, Cravath Admits Breach
as Law Firm Hacks Go Public, AMLAW DAILY, Mar. 30, 2016, at 1 (describing an IT breach that occurred
at two firms during the summer of 2015); see also Vincent R. Johnson, Cybersecurity, Identity Theft, and the
Limits of Tort Liability, 57 S.C. L. REV. 255, 281 (2005) (footnotes omitted) (“In light of the fiduciaryduty rules on confidentiality (and the related obligations requiring safekeeping of client property), a
lawyer or law firm could not plausibly argue that there is no duty to safeguard computerized client data
from intruders.”); Vincent R. Johnson, Credit-Monitoring Damages in Cybersecurity Tort Litigation, 19 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 113, 130–31 (2011) (discussing a case where “[t]he court ordered the responsible
attorney to pay for five years of credit monitoring to protect the plaintiff from identity theft”).
26. See Vincent R. Johnson, “Absolute and Perfect Candor” to Clients, 34 ST. MARY’S L.J. 737, 782
(2003) (discussing “materiality” and stating “[c]ourts have repeatedly recognized that the fiduciary
obligations of an attorney require disclosure of facts that are material to the representation”).
27. In addressing the factual causation requirement in legal malpractice actions, the language of
the courts varies, but the underlying ideas are often the same. In Reppucci v. Nadeau, 238 A.3d 994, 999
(Me. 2020), the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine simply stated that “a legal malpractice plaintiff must
establish that he or she was deprived of a ‘more favorable result’ in the underlying case by proving
what its outcome would have been had the attorney not been negligent.” Similarly, in Gulfport
OB-GYN, P.A. v. Dukes, Dukes, Keating & Faneca, P.A., 283 So. 3d 676, 679 (Miss. 2019), the Supreme
Court of Mississippi made clear that showing there would have been a “[b]etter [d]eal” or “[n]o [d]eal”
are ways of showing there would have been a more favorable result. As the court explained:
Causation in a negligence-based legal-malpractice claim for a breach of the duty of care requires
proof that, but for the attorney’s negligence, a more favorable result would have been obtained.
Thus, when the complaint is that the attorney should have proposed different or additional terms
to a transaction, the malpractice plaintiff must show that such terms would have been accepted
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of that duty, and a different course that would have achieved a better
outcome—may be proved, to an important extent, based on the plaintiff’s
own testimony.28 This tight focus tends to cut through the bewildering
complexities that are common to legal malpractice litigation: a wide-ranging
battle of experts, multitudinous documents, confusing layers of litigation,
and a cast with too many actors and entities.29
The informed consent doctrine also makes sense as a matter of public
policy because clients have a right to control important matters related to
their representation.30 As expressed by the Illinois Appellate Court:
The purpose of such a rule is to enable the client to make an informed decision
as to whether the foreseeable risks of a proposed legal course of action are
justified by its potential benefits when compared to other alternative courses
of action.31

How can a lawyer defending a negligence action claim to have acted
reasonably if the lawyer failed to disclose material risks and alternatives
related to the representation? If the negligent nondisclosure causes harm,
by the other party or that the client would not have entered into the deal and would have been
better off for doing so.
Id. at 681.
28. Cf. Tye v. Beausay, 156 N.E.3d 331, 343 (Ohio Ct. App. 2020) (“[I]n situations involving
informed consent, a ‘patient’s hindsight’ (i.e., testimony as to her hypothetical response to the
undisclosed information), while relevant, is not determinative.” (quoting Nickell v. Gonzalez,
477 N.E.2d 1145, 1149 (Ohio 1985))); Conklin v. Hannoch Weisman, 678 A.2d 1060, 1070 (N.J. 1996)
(“[A] legal malpractice claimant’s testimony concerning whether he or she would have entered into a
transaction, if adequately informed of its risks, is [not] irrelevant. A client’s attitude about risk is a part
of that client and is a component of proximate cause.”).
29. See Fortney & Johnson, Legal Malpractice, supra note 1, § 5-2.3(a)(2)(A), at 777 (discussing
factual complexity in legal malpractice litigation).
30. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE L. GOVERNING LAWS. § 22(1) (AM. L. INST. 2000)
(“[T]he following and comparable decisions are reserved to the client except when the client has validly
authorized the lawyer to make the particular decision: whether and on what terms to settle a claim;
how a criminal defendant should plead; whether a criminal defendant should waive jury trial; whether
a criminal defendant should testify; and whether to appeal in a civil proceeding or criminal
prosecution.”); see also Vincent R. Johnson, Solicitation of Law Firm Clients by Departing Partners and
Associates: Tort, Fiduciary, and Disciplinary Liability, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 81 (1988) (footnote omitted)
(“Clients alone have the right to decide who shall represent them. They cannot exercise such rights
intelligently if they are deprived of relevant information.”); cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
R. 1.17 cmt. 9 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (“All elements of client autonomy, including the client’s absolute
right to discharge a lawyer and transfer the representation to another, survive the sale of the practice
or area of practice.”).
31. Metrick v. Chatz, 639 N.E.2d 198, 201 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).

2021]

The Informed Consent Doctrine in Legal Malpractice Law

371

imposing liability for proximately caused damages is fair. “The ultimate test
for any body of law addressing issues of professional liability is whether the
law operates with a sufficient degree of fairness that aggrieved individuals
are willing to resolve their disputes through legal channels, rather than by
resorting to brute force.”32 The doctrine of informed consent helps ensure
legal malpractice law measures up to this jurisprudential standard of fairness.
This Article explores the informed consent doctrine in legal malpractice
law. Part II discusses the rise of the informed consent doctrine in medical
malpractice law. Part III traces the transplantation of the language and
principles of informed consent into the law of lawyer discipline.33 Part IV
explores what the relevant legal malpractice case law says about the
obligation to obtain informed consent. Part V addresses certain pivotal
issues in the operation of the informed consent doctrine in claims by clients
against lawyers, including the nature of lawyer disclosure obligations, the
limits imposed by the scope of the representation, the role of expert
testimony, and the standard for proving factual causation. Part VI offers
concluding thoughts.
II. INFORMED CONSENT IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW
In medical malpractice law, the doctrine of informed consent, first
recognized around 1960,34 is widely established today.35 In some
jurisdictions, it requires not only disclosure of risks related to a course of
32. Vincent R. Johnson, The Importance of Doctor Liability in Medical Malpractice Law: China Versus
the United States, 10 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 2, 28 (2019).
33. See Metrick, 639 N.E.2d at 201 (“It is the duty of every attorney to inform a client of the
available options for alternative legal solutions, as well as to explain the foreseeable risks and benefits
of each. . . . This proposition is nothing more than an application of the long-standing rule pertinent
to a cause of action for medical negligence premised upon a lack of informed consent.”).
34. See Spiegel, supra note 13, at 44 (“Beginning about 1960, courts began to reexamine the
consent doctrine. They began looking beyond the explicit or implicit signal from patient to doctor to
examine the content of the ‘bargaining process.’ They began asking whether the doctor had
communicated sufficient information to the patient about the proposed treatment and possible
alternatives.”).
35. See Sam F. Halabi, Against Fiduciary Utopianism: The Regulation of Physician Conflicts of Interest and
Standards of Care, 11 UC IRVINE L. REV. 433, 447 (2020) (footnotes omitted) (“Since its first official
appearance in 1957, informed consent has been significantly expanded. Now situated in medical
negligence, a physician has a duty to disclose to a patient the material risks associated with a proposed
procedure when a reasonable patient would need to hear that information to make an informed
decision.”); see also Buu Nguyen v. IHC Med. Servs., 288 P.3d 1084, 1091–92 (Utah Ct. App. 2012)
(holding it may be “appropriate to impose a duty on a hospital to obtain informed consent when
unfamiliar equipment on loan to the hospital, as the hospital considers its possible purchase, is used
outside of the normal course of the hospital’s established procedures”).
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treatment,36 but also the potentially conflicting research and economic
interests of the medical professional seeking to obtain consent.37
The informed consent doctrine in medicine is rooted in a fundamental
belief that “[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right
to determine what shall be done with his [or her] own body[.]”38 “[T]he
patient’s right of self-determination implies a right to important
information . . . .”39 Under the doctrine, a physician has an obligation to
disclose the material risks of, and relevant alternatives to, a proposed course
of treatment. “The gist of the informed consent claim is that the physician
failed to provide information to the patient, usually about the risk of the
proposed procedure or about safer alternatives.”40 The failure to make such
disclosures and obtain patient consent before rendering treatment may be a

36. See Caroline Lowry, Intersex in 2018: Evaluating the Limitations of Informed Consent in Medical
Malpractice Claims as a Vehicle for Gender Justice, 52 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 321, 336 (2019) (“The
common law duty of informed consent obligates doctors to disclose information pertaining to
diagnosis, procedures, and the likely outcomes of procedures.”).
37. In Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990), the California Supreme Court
wrote:
Moore repeatedly alleges that Golde failed to disclose the extent of his research and economic
interests in Moore’s cells before obtaining consent to the medical procedures by which the cells
were extracted. These allegations, in our view, state a cause of action against Golde for invading
a legally protected interest of his patient. This cause of action can properly be characterized either
as the breach of a fiduciary duty to disclose facts material to the patient’s consent or, alternatively,
as the performance of medical procedures without first having obtained the patient’s informed
consent.
Id. at 483 (footnote omitted).
38. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (quoting Schloendorff v. Soc’y of
N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914)); see Brad Nokes et al., Difficult Discharges: Sending Patients Out
Without Getting Into Trouble, 14 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 60, 81 (2020) (“Autonomy and selfdetermination have long been pillars of informed consent.”); cf. Samuel D. Hodge, Jr. & Jack E.
Hubbard, Covid-19: The Ethical and Legal Implications of Medical Rationing, 56 GONZ. L. REV. 159, 183
(2021) (footnotes omitted) (“There may come a time when hospitals will have to make difficult
decisions on how to ration ventilators. Some say that ethical principles should be the guide for
ventilator allocation based upon ‘respect for persons and their autonomy, beneficence . . . , and justice.’
This first principle, deference and respect to patients and their autonomy, mandates doctors secure a
person’s informed consent and honor any informed refusal.” (quoting Ventilator Document
Workgroup, Ethical Considerations for Decision Making Regarding Allocation of Mechanical Ventilators During a
Severe Influenza Pandemic or Other Public Health Emergency, CDC 10 (July 1, 2011), https://www.cdc.
gov/about/advisory/pdf/VentDocument_Release.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ACH-C4E9])).
39. DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., HORNBOOK ON TORTS 513 (2d ed. 2016).
40. Id. at 495 (footnote omitted).
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breach of the professional duties the physician owes to the patient.41 That
breach will permit the patient to recover damages from the physician in a
negligence action, even if the physician otherwise exercised care, provided
the plaintiff proves that but for the nondisclosure the patient would have
chosen a different course and thereby avoided the harm caused by the
undisclosed risks.42 “Some courts require the physician to disclose all
material information, while others say that what the physician must disclose
is determined by medical custom, not by what is relevant to the patient’s
decision-making.”43
As summarized by the Ohio Court of Appeals:
The tort of lack of informed consent, as established in Ohio, contains the
following requirements:
(a) The physician fails to disclose to the patient and discuss the material risks
and dangers inherently and potentially involved with respect to the proposed
therapy, if any;
(b) the unrevealed risks and dangers which should have been disclosed by the
physician actually materialize and are the proximate cause of the injury to
the patient; and
(c) a reasonable person in the position of the patient would have decided against
the therapy had the material risks and dangers inherent and incidental to
treatment been disclosed to him or her prior to the therapy.44

A. Materiality
With respect to materiality, it is normally “for the trier of fact to
determine whether a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position would have
41. See Brodsky v. Osunkwo, No. L-2564-08, 2012 WL 1161598, at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. Apr. 10, 2012) (reinstating an informed consent negligence claim against a doctor who failed to
tell a sixteen-year-old male leukemia patient that chemotherapy would cause infertility and he could
have banked his sperm before submitting to the treatment).
42. DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 39, at 515 (requiring a plaintiff to prove proximate
causation).
43. Id. at 495 (footnote omitted).
44. Tye v. Beausay, 156 N.E.3d 331, 342–43 (Ohio Ct. App. 2020); see also DAN B. DOBBS ET
AL., supra note 39, at 515 (footnotes omitted) (“[T]he plaintiff must prove five things:
(1) nondisclosure of required information[;] (2) actual damage . . . [;] (3) resulting from risks about
which the patient was not informed; (4) factual cause, which is to say that the plaintiff would have
rejected the medical treatment if she had known the risk[;] and (5) that reasonable persons, if properly
informed, would have rejected the proposed treatment.”).
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attached significance to the undisclosed material risks and dangers
inherently and potentially involved with the procedure and would have
decided against the procedure.”45 However, the test for materiality in some
states may be objective or subjective. In such jurisdictions, information is
material if it is that “which a reasonable patient would consider in deciding
whether to undergo the medical procedure[,]”46 or “[i]f the patient attaches
special importance to some particular matter and the doctor knows or
should know [that] . . . .”47
B. Exceptions
Case law and commentary have recognized there are a limited number of
situations where a disclosure of risks need not be made. As the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma explained in Scott v. Bradford: 48
There is no need to disclose risks that either ought to be known by everyone
or are already known to the patient. Further, the primary duty of a physician
is to do what is best for his patient and where full disclosure would be
detrimental to a patient’s total care and best interests a physician may withhold
such disclosure, for example, where disclosure would alarm an emotionally
upset or apprehensive patient. Certainly too, where there is an emergency and
the patient is in no condition to determine for himself whether treatment
should be administered, the privilege may be invoked.49

45. Tye, 156 N.E.3d at 343 (quoting White v. Leimbach, 959 N.E.2d 1033, 1041 (Ohio 2011));
cf. DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 39, at 517 (stating “expert testimony is not required” on the issue
of materiality). But see id. at 516 (footnotes omitted) (“[A] little more than half the states, many under
the command of a statute, appear to adopt the medical standard of disclosure as a general rule rather
than the materiality standard, or alternatively specify major limitations on the claim that are more
demanding than the materiality standard.”).
46. DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 39, at 518 (quoting Moure v. Raeuchle, 604 A.2d 1003,
1008 (Pa. 1992)).
47. Id.
48. Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1979).
49. Id. at 558 (footnotes omitted); see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON
ON TORTS 192 (5th ed. 1984) (footnotes omitted) (stating “the physician is not required to disclose
risks that are unexpected or immaterial” or where the patient has waived the “right to receive the
information”); Conklin v. Hannoch Weisman, P.C., 678 A.2d 1060, 1069 (N.J. 1996) (discussing
informed consent in the legal malpractice context, the court stated “some clients may sufficiently
understand aspects of a financial transaction, such as the priority of mortgages, so as not to impose a
duty on their lawyer to explain the transaction in detail”).
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C. Factual Causation of Damages
Because all negligence actions require proof that damage was caused by a
breach of duty, a patient must show, in an informed consent action, not only
that there was a failure to disclose but also that the non-disclosure was
causally related to some injury. No action will lie if the factfinder believes
the patient would have consented to the same course of treatment had full
Of course, it is difficult to ascertain,
disclosure been made.50
retrospectively, what a patient would or would not have done had the facts
been different, and courts, predictably, are split on the question of what test
to apply in making that inquiry.
Most jurisdictions have rejected the subjective approach and have
adopted an objective test, which inquires whether a reasonable person
would have consented to the treatment if the risks and alternatives had been
disclosed.51 The theory is that if a reasonable person would have refused
treatment, it is likely this particular plaintiff would also have refused.
Some states hold that both a subjective test and an objective test must be
met.52 In these jurisdictions, a patient will not recover damages in an
informed consent action if, when fully informed, either a reasonable person
or the particular plaintiff would have agreed to the treatment in question.53
D. Medical Informed Consent Statutes
In some states, the common law doctrine of informed consent in
medicine has been augmented or replaced by statutory developments. For
example, Texas has adopted detailed legislation54 which creates a state
Medical Disclosure Panel “to determine which risks and hazards related to
50. But see Fitzpatrick v. Natter, 961 A.2d 1229, 1237 (Pa. 2008) (citation omitted) (stating a
patient bringing a claim based on lack of informed consent must prove the undisclosed “information
would have factored substantially into her decision-making process. The patient need not show that
she would have chosen differently had she possessed the missing information, but only that the missing
information would have been a substantial factor in this decision”).
51. See Ashe v. Radiation Oncology Assocs., 9 S.W.3d 119, 122–24 (Tenn. 1999) (endorsing the
majority objective standard, which requires the jury to find that a reasonable person would have made
a different decision).
52. See DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 39, at 522 (discussing the dual requirement).
53. See id. (“[T]he plaintiff will fail if she would have accepted the medical procedure even when
fully informed, and she will also fail if she would have rejected [treatment] but a reasonable person
would not have.”).
54. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 74.101–.107 (regulating the only theory of
recovery, the duties and responsibilities of the Texas Medical Disclosure Panel, the disclosure duty of
physicians or health care providers, the manner and effect of such disclosures, and informed consent
for hysterectomies).
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medical care and surgical procedures must be disclosed by health care
providers or physicians . . . .”55 A New York statute provides:
Limitation of medical, dental or podiatric malpractice action based on lack of informed
consent
1.

Lack of informed consent means the failure of the person providing the
professional treatment or diagnosis to disclose to the patient such
alternatives thereto and the reasonably foreseeable risks and benefits
involved as a reasonable medical, dental or podiatric practitioner under
similar circumstances would have disclosed, in a manner permitting the
patient to make a knowledgeable evaluation.

2.

The right of action to recover for medical, dental or podiatric malpractice
based on a lack of informed consent is limited to those cases involving either
(a) non-emergency treatment, procedure or surgery, or (b) a diagnostic
procedure which involved invasion or disruption of the integrity of the
body.

3.

For a cause of action therefor it must also be established that a reasonably
prudent person in the patient’s position would not have undergone the
treatment or diagnosis if he had been fully informed and that the lack of
informed consent is a proximate cause of the injury or condition for which
recovery is sought.

4.

It shall be a defense to any action for medical, dental or podiatric malpractice
based upon an alleged failure to obtain such an informed consent that:
(a) the risk not disclosed is too commonly known to warrant disclosure; or
(b) the patient assured the medical, dental or podiatric practitioner he
would undergo the treatment, procedure or diagnosis regardless of the
risk involved, or the patient assured the medical, dental or podiatric
practitioner that he did not want to be informed of the matters to which
he would be entitled to be informed; or
(c) consent by or on behalf of the patient was not reasonably possible; or
(d) the medical, dental or podiatric practitioner, after considering all of the
attendant facts and circumstances, used reasonable discretion as to the
manner and extent to which such alternatives or risks were disclosed to
the patient because he reasonably believed that the manner and extent

55. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.102(a).
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of such disclosure could reasonably be expected to adversely and
substantially affect the patient’s condition.56

Some courts have held that carelessness on the part of a patient is a
defense to an action under the state medical informed consent statute. For
example, in Brown v. Dibbell,57 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin stated:
A patient is usually the primary source of information about the patient’s
material personal, family and medical histories. If a doctor is to provide a
patient with the information required by Wis. Stat. § 448.30, it is imperative
that in response to a doctor’s material questions a patient provide information
that is as complete and accurate as possible under the circumstances.58

III. INFORMED CONSENT IN THE LAW OF LAWYER DISCIPLINE
With respect to the practice of law, there is some evidence informed
consent principles may have been recognized in legal malpractice actions for
damages even before they formed the basis for lawyer discipline.59
However, during the past two decades, the pattern of development has been
strongly to the contrary, spreading informed consent principles from lawyer
ethics codes to the common law principles, which define the terms for legal
malpractice liability.
The American Bar Association (ABA) Model Code of Professional
Responsibility (Model Code) was promulgated in 1969, and the Model Code
was amended at various times as late as 1980.60 Versions of the Model
Code were once the law in almost every state.61 A search of the 1980 text
56. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d (McKinney 2021).
57. Brown v. Dibbell, 595 N.W.2d 358 (Wis. 1999).
58. Id. at 368.
59. See Martyn, supra note 13, at 330 (discussing caselaw demonstrating the importance of
informing clients about their options). Professor Martyn stated long ago:
Clients have successfully alleged in malpractice suits, or as grounds for other relief, failure to
disclose information material to the client’s decision, failure to disclose conflicts of interest, and
failure to disclose an attorney’s opinion regarding the merits of a case. By creating an affirmative
duty to inform the client, these decisions permit the client to make an informed choice about the
next course of action.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
60. See generally MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESP. (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980) (detailing the
responsibilities of lawyers).
61. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 56 (1986) (“[T]he 1969 Code was
an impressive and quick success.”). “[B]y 1972 the adoption committee could report that every
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of the Model Code reveals that nowhere did it use the term “informed
consent,” even though the term “consent” was mentioned in at least eight
Ethical Considerations (ECs)62 and eight Disciplinary Rules (DRs).63 By
1980, “informed consent,” as a term of art, had not yet found a place in the
language of lawyer discipline, nor in the developing field of legal malpractice.
In 1980, Professor Mark Spiegel wrote:
The doctrine of informed consent . . . combines the patient’s right to make a
decision with a requirement that the physician provide sufficient information
to make the exercise of that right meaningful. No similar general doctrine
applies to the lawyer-client relationship.64

Yet, it is possible to see that by 1980 the law of lawyering was moving in
the direction of recognizing the doctrine of informed consent as a key
principle. At least two ECs65 and four DRs66 in the Model Code coupled
consent with a requirement of full disclosure. One DR was even more
specific, conditioning consent to an aggregate settlement on the prior
disclosure of the “existence and nature of all the claims . . . .”67 By 1986,
Professor Charles Wolfram’s landmark hornbook, Modern Legal Ethics, richly
detailed “[a] fuller description than the lawyer codes suggest” concerning
“the contents of a disclosure or consultation specifically addressed to
conflicts problems.”68
In 1983, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility was superseded
as a pattern ethics code by the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model
Rules).69 The Model Rules have frequently been amended. The current
version of the Model Rules defines the term “informed consent” as follows:
jurisdiction had taken steps to adopt the Code except three states . . . . Two of those states adopted
the Code soon thereafter, and it has had a strong influence in California as well . . . .” Id. at 56–57
(footnote omitted).
62. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESP. ECS 2-21, 2-22, 4-2, 4-5. 5-3, 5-16, 6-3, 7-18 (AM. BAR
ASS’N 1980) (mentioning “consent”).
63. See id. at DRS 2-107, 4-101, 5-101, 5-104, 5-105, 5-106, 5-107, 7-104 (noting the same).
64. Spiegel, supra note 13, at 48–49.
65. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESP. ECS 4-2, 4-5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980) (requiring consent
after full disclosure).
66. See id. at DRS 4-101, 5-101, 5-104, 5-107 (requiring the same).
67. Id. at DR 5-106.
68. WOLFRAM, supra note 61, at 345.
69. See Michael S. Ariens, American Legal Ethics in an Age of Anxiety, 40 ST. MARY’S L.J. 343, 348
(2008) (footnotes omitted) (“Despite [the Model Code’s] overwhelming success, the ABA appointed a
commission in 1977 to evaluate ‘all facets of legal ethics.’ The commission, chaired by Nebraska lawyer
Robert Kutak, fashioned the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, approved by the ABA in 1983.”).
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“Informed consent” denotes the agreement by a person to a proposed course
of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and
explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to
the proposed course of conduct.70

The term informed consent, which was added to the Model Rules in 2002,
“replaced the term ‘consent after consultation,’ which had been used in the
rules as promulgated in 1983.”71 “[The] change in terminology was not
controversial, because everyone agreed that the original phraseology was
intended to convey exactly the same meaning . . . .”72
The term “informed consent” is used today in the Model Rules in ten
blackletter rules (often coupled with a requirement that the informed
consent be “confirmed in writing”)73 and eight official comments.74 The
blackletter rules provide as follows:
•

Model Rule 1.2 (“Scope of Representation & Allocation of
Authority Between Client & Lawyer”): “A lawyer may limit the
scope of the representation if the limitation is reasonable under the
circumstances and the client gives informed consent[;]”75

•

Model Rule 1.4 (Communications): “A lawyer shall . . . promptly
inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to
which the client’s informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0(e), is
required by these Rules[;]”76

•

Model Rule 1.6 (Confidentiality of Information): “A lawyer shall not
reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless
the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly
authorized in order to carry out the representation or the disclosure

70. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0(e) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
71. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW OF LAWYERING 3-6 (4th ed. 2020).
72. Id.
73. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (“‘Confirmed in
writing,’ when used in reference to the informed consent of a person, denotes informed consent that
is given in writing by the person or a writing that a lawyer promptly transmits to the person confirming
an oral informed consent. . . . If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the
person gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time
thereafter.”).
74. Id. at R. 1.1 cmt. 6, R. 1.7 cmt. 1, R. 1.10 cmt. 6, R. 1.17 cmt. 11, R. 3.7 cmt. 6, R. 5.4 cmt. 2,
R. 6.5 cmt. 2, R. 8.5 cmt. 5.
75. Id. at R. 1.2(c).
76. Id. at R. 1.4(a)(1).
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is permitted by paragraph (b) [which details seven exceptions to the
duty of confidentiality;]”77
•

Model Rule 1.7 (“Conflict of Interest: Current Clients”):
“Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of
interest . . . a lawyer may represent a client if: . . . each affected client
gives informed consent, confirmed in writing[;]”78

•

Model Rule 1.8 (Conflict of Interest: Current Clients: Specific
Rules):
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client
or knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other
pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless:
....
(3) the client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the
client, to the essential terms of the transaction and the
lawyer’s role in the transaction, including whether the lawyer
is representing the client in the transaction;79
(f) A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client
from one other than the client unless:
(1) the client gives informed consent;80
(g) A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate
in making an aggregate settlement of the claims of or against the
clients, or in a criminal case an aggregated agreement as to guilty
or nolo contendere pleas, unless each client gives informed
consent, in a writing signed by the client.81

•

Model Rule 1.9 (Duties to Former Clients):
(a) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall
not thereafter represent another person in the same or a
substantially related matter in which that person’s interests are

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at R. 1.6(a)–(b).
Id. at R. 1.7(b)(4).
Id. at R. 1.8(a)(3).
Id. at R. 1.8(f)(1).
Id. at R. 1.8(g).
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materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the
former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.82
(b) A lawyer shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or a
substantially related matter in which a firm with which the lawyer
formerly was associated had previously represented a client
(1) whose interests are materially adverse to that person; and
(2) about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected
by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c) that is material to the matter; unless
the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in
writing.83

•

Model Rule 1.11 (“Special Conflicts of Interest for Former &
Current Government Officers & Employees”):
(a) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer who has
formerly served as a public officer or employee of the
government:
(1) is subject to Rule 1.9(c) [restricting use or disclosure of
information concerning a former client]; and
(2) shall not otherwise represent a client in connection with a
matter in which the lawyer participated personally and
substantially as a public officer or employee, unless the
appropriate government agency gives its informed consent,
confirmed in writing, to the representation.84
(d) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer currently
serving as a public officer or employee:
(1) is subject to Rules 1.7 and 1.9; and
(2) shall not:
(i) participate in a matter in which the lawyer participated
personally and substantially while in private practice or
nongovernmental employment, unless the appropriate

82. Id. at R. 1.9(a).
83. Id. at R. 1.9(b).
84. Id. at R. 1.11(a)(1)–(2).
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government agency gives its informed consent,
confirmed in writing . . . .85

•

Model Rule 1.12 (“Former Judge, Arbitrator, Mediator or Other
Third-Party Neutral”):
(a) Except as stated in paragraph (d), a lawyer shall not represent
anyone in connection with a matter in which the lawyer
participated personally and substantially as a judge or other
adjudicative officer or law clerk to such a person or as an
arbitrator, mediator or other third-party neutral, unless all parties
to the proceeding give informed consent, confirmed in writing.86

•

Model Rule 1.18 (Duties to Prospective Client): “When the lawyer
has received disqualifying information . . . representation is
permissible if: (1) both the affected client and the prospective client
have given informed consent, confirmed in writing”;87 and

•

Model Rule 2.3 (“Evaluation for Use by Third Persons”): “When
the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the evaluation is
likely to affect the client’s interests materially and adversely, the
lawyer shall not provide the evaluation unless the client gives
informed consent.”88

The unifying threat running throughout these black letter rules is that a
clear majority of the quoted informed consent provisions deal with conflicts
of interest.89 However, four of the informed consent provisions are
definitely more wide-ranging and may apply to matters not involving
conflicts of interest.
These include: Model Rule 1.2 (Scope of
Representation);90 Model Rule 1.4 (Communications), Model Rule 1.6

85. Id. at R. 1.11(d)(1)–(2)(i).
86. Id. at R. 1.12(a).
87. Id. at R. 1.18(d)(1).
88. Id. at R. 2.3(b).
89. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE L. GOVERNING LAWS. § 122 (AM. L. INST. 2000)
(“(1) A lawyer may represent a client notwithstanding a conflict of interest prohibited by
§ 121 if each affected client or former client gives informed consent to the lawyer’s representation.
Informed consent requires that the client or former client have reasonably adequate information about
the material risks of such representation to that client or former client.”).
90. See SCB Diversified Mun. Portfolio v. Crews & Assocs., No. 09-7251, 2012 WL 13708, at *2
(E.D. La. Jan. 4, 2012) (noting plaintiff unsuccessfully sought to recover damages against the
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(Confidentiality of Information), and Model Rule 1.1 comment 6
(Competence).91 Thus, it is not possible to minimize the breadth of
informed consent principles in lawyer discipline by dismissing them as
merely special rules related to conflicts of interest. Instead, these disclosure
requirements define a broader range of obligations.
A failure to obtain informed consent when required by applicable
disciplinary rules will, of course, give rise to disciplinary liability.92 The next
Part examines how informed consent principles have been broadly
incorporated into legal malpractice jurisprudence. Three types of cases are
examined: (1) malpractice cases applying the informed consent provisions
set down in the Model Rules or state variations thereof; (2) malpractice cases
expressly recognizing the obligations of lawyers to obtain informed consent,
but not expressly relying on provisions in the Model Rules or state
variations; and (3) malpractice cases recognizing the obligation of lawyers to
disclose the risks of, and alternatives to, a proposed course of action, but
without using the language of informed consent or expressly relying on the
Model Rules or state variations. These cases show, in a wide range of
disputes, failure to disclose risks and alternatives and obtain informed
consent will support a legal malpractice action for damages.
Over the course of many years, the extension of informed consent
principles from medical malpractice law to legal malpractice law was aided
by the arguments of scholars who sought to advance this course of
jurisprudential development.93 The continuing influence of medical
defendants for, among other things, “failure to obtain informed consent for the limited scope of
representation it outlined in its engagement letter”).
91. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 6 (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2020) (“Before a
lawyer retains or contracts with other lawyers outside the lawyer’s own firm to provide or assist in the
provision of legal services to a client, the lawyer should ordinarily obtain informed consent from the
client and must reasonably believe that the other lawyers’ services will contribute to the competent and
ethical representation of the client.”).
92. See Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Begovic, 137 N.E.3d 87, 92, 95 (Ohio 2019) (imposing a oneyear suspension from practice based on various ethics violations, including the lawyer’s violation of
“his duty to inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client’s
informed consent was required and the duty to keep the client reasonably informed”); see also Iowa Sup.
Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Willey, 889 N.W.2d 647, 658 (Iowa 2017) (suspending an attorney’s license
to practice law “with no possibility of reinstatement for sixty days” based on failure to obtain informed
consent to various conflicts); Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Shapiro, 108 A.3d 394, 418 (Md.
2015) (basing an indefinite suspension, in part, on violations of the informed consent duties imposed
by the disciplinary rules); Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n v. Walker, 32 N.E.3d 437, 438–39 (Ohio 2015)
(imposing a one-year suspension based, in part, on a violation of informed consent requirements).
93. See Martyn, supra note 13, at 310–11, 346–47 (examining the “philosophical basis and the
common law roots of the informed consent doctrine” and proposing a model statute); see also Lisa G.
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malpractice law on legal malpractice law is sometimes vividly apparent with
respect to informed consent. In Washington State, for example, the
language of the legal malpractice informed consent jury instruction “is nearly
identical to Washington pattern instruction 105.04, the medical health care
informed consent instruction.”94
IV. INFORMED CONSENT IN LEGAL MALPRACTICE LAW
It is not surprising that the doctrine of informed consent is now
recognized in legal malpractice law as well as medical malpractice law:
Clients, like patients, have a right to exercise extensive control over their own
affairs, including their legal representation. Consequently, there is no reason
why the informed consent doctrine should not apply as readily to legal
malpractice cases as it does in suits against physicians.95

A. Malpractice Cases Citing and Applying Informed Consent Provisions Found in
Ethics Rules
It is well established that the mere violation of a disciplinary rule by an
attorney does not create a civil cause of action for an aggrieved client.
However, it is equally clear that in legal malpractice actions, many courts
treat the disciplinary rules as evidence of the standard of care, and violations
of those rules as evidence of professional negligence or breach of fiduciary
duty. According to the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers:

Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 659, 670 (1990) (“Some scholars call for an informed
consent doctrine in legal malpractice, such as has become a standard in medical malpractice.”); Paul R.
Tremblay, On Persuasion and Paternalism: Lawyer Decisionmaking and the Questionably Competent Client,
1987 UTAH L. REV. 515, 515 n.1 (stating “[m]uch has been written over the past two decades about
informed consent and its applicability to lawyering” and identifying commentators and scholars).
94. Edleman v. Russell, 167 Wash. App. 1050, at *4 n.3 (Apr. 30, 2012).
95. Fortney & Johnson, Legal Malpractice, supra note 1, § 5-2.2(n), at 769. But see Conklin v.
Hannoch Weisman, 678 A.2d 1060, 1069 (N.J. 1996) (“The difference that we see is that in many
instances the business client, unlike the medical patient, is not sick when the client consults an attorney.
The business client is often motivated to enter into a legal transaction for many more reasons than a
medical patient and may be at no risk at all at the inception of the transaction. Moreover, while most
patients will not appreciate the risks of medical treatments absent an explanation by a doctor, many
clients may understand as well as their attorney, if not better, the risks of a commercial business
transaction.”).
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Proof of violation of a rule or statute regulating the conduct of lawyers:
(a) does not give rise to an implied cause of action for professional
negligence or breach of fiduciary duty;
(b) does not preclude other proof concerning the duty of care . . . ; and
(c) may be considered by a trier of fact as an aid in understanding and
applying the standard of [care] to the extent that (i) the rule or statute
was designed for the protection of persons in the position of the
claimant and (ii) proof of the content and construction of such a rule
or statute is relevant to the claimant’s claim.96

Legal malpractice cases frequently refer to the informed consent
requirements imposed by the Model Rules, or state variations thereof, in
explaining the standard of care applicable to claims by clients against
lawyers.97 Some of these cases do little to illuminate the requirements of
96. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE L. GOVERNING LAWS. § 52(2) (AM. L. INST. 2000).
97. See, e.g., Dziesinski v. Mack, No. 208555, 1999 WL 33327124, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 10,
1999) (“Defendant failed to discuss with plaintiffs any potential or actual conflict of interest arising out
of his simultaneous representation of them and Brian. Disclosure of any such potential or actual
conflict of interest is required. MRPC 1.7. . . . [I]t was more likely than not that defendant’s actions
resulted in actual injury to plaintiffs . . . .”). But see ITC Com. Funding, LLC v. Crerar, 713 S.E.2d 335,
337–38 (S.C. Ct. App. 2011) (stating the rule does not create a presumption of a breach of duty).
The Crerar court wrote:
The Appellant argues West represented her in default negotiations for one year, and she had the
right to assume he would continue to represent her. The Appellant contends that considering
her age and inexperience in legal matters, West’s letter should have contained an explanation of
the risks regarding his limited representation. She also maintains West should have discussed his
representation with her personally and in the presence of a family member or family attorney, and
obtained a response from her to ensure she understood his inability to represent her. The
Appellant contends the trial court erred in failing to consider Rule 1.2 of the Rules of Professional
Conduct (RPC), Rule 407, SCACR.
Pursuant to Rule 1.2(c), RPC: “A lawyer may limit the scope of the representation if the
limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed consent.”
Informed consent “denotes the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the
lawyer has communicated reasonably adequate information and explanation about the material
risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.”
....
We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding West’s letter to the Appellant
sufficiently advised her that West could not represent her. While the Appellant maintains she is
entitled to relief from judgment because she did not give West her informed consent pursuant to
Rule 1.2(c), RPC, we note our supreme court determined “the failure to comply with the RPC
should not . . . be considered as evidence of negligence per se.” Smith v. Haynsworth, Marion,
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informed consent or the potential applicability of informed consent
obligations to cases not citing disciplinary rules imposing such requirements.
Other cases are very much to the contrary.
1.

The Aggregate Settlement Rule

Some of the references in legal malpractice cases to “informed consent”
are related to the Model Rule provision imposing informed consent
requirements tied to aggregate settlements.98 Consider, for example, Frank
v. OOO RM Invest.99 In that case, the analysis of a federal court in New
York unhesitatingly embraced provisions patterned on the informed
consent requirements of Model Rule 1.8(g)100 in ruling on motions in a legal
malpractice case. As the court explained:
The parties dispute the relevance of a rule governing the Florida Bar, referred
to as an “aggregate settlement rule,” which provides that “[a] lawyer who
represents 2 or more clients shall not participate in making an aggregate
settlement of the claims of or against the clients . . . unless each client gives
informed consent, in a writing signed by the client.” The Settling Parties’
counterclaim alleges that the Frank Parties committed legal malpractice by
negotiating the underlying settlement “without first seeking and obtaining an
agreement among the Settling Parties regarding the division of the Settlement

McKay & Geurard, 322 S.C. 433, 437 n.6, 472 S.E.2d 612, 614 n.6 (1996); see also Preamble to
RPC, Rule 407, SCACR (“[A] violation of a Rule should not itself give rise to a cause of action
against a lawyer nor should it create any presumption in such a case that a legal duty has been
breached”).
Id. at 337–38 (alterations in original) (second omission in original).
98. See Booth v. Davis, No. 10-4010-KHV, 2016 WL 1624076, at *8 (D. Kan. Apr. 25, 2016)
(“[P]laintiffs assert that Davis breached his duties to Connie and Scott Booth (1) in negotiating the
aggregate settlement without pushing for a better offer, (2) failing to disclose to Connie Booth the
existence and nature of all claims and the participation of each person in the aggregate settlement and
thus (3) failing to obtain her informed consent to the aggregate global settlement.”). Booth was later
affirmed. Booth v. Davis, 690 F. App’x 571, 573–75 (10th Cir. 2017). The opinion of the Tenth Circuit
mentioned, but did not discuss, the informed consent requirement for aggregate settlements. Id.
at 573, 575.
99. Frank v. OOO RM Inv., No. 17-CV-1338 (NGG) (ARL), 2020 WL 7022317 (E.D.N.Y.
Nov. 30, 2020).
100. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (“A lawyer who
represents two or more clients shall not participate in making an aggregate settlement of the claims of
or against the clients, or in a criminal case an aggregated agreement as to guilty or nolo contendere
pleas, unless each client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client. The lawyer’s
disclosure shall include the existence and nature of all the claims or pleas involved and of the
participation of each person in the settlement.”).
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Funds as required by Rule 4-1.8(g).” . . . [U.S. Magistrate] Judge Lindsay
recommended denying the Frank Parties’ motion to dismiss this aspect of the
malpractice claim, finding that the Frank Parties’ compliance with the rule was
a factual issue, and that its alleged violation of the rule could be evidence of
negligence. . . .
The Settling Parties contend that by failing to address the apportionment of
the settlement among its clients, the Frank Parties deprived them of their
ability to give informed consent to the settlement, as required by the aggregate
settlement rule. . . .
Because the Frank Parties do not adequately establish that their alleged failure
to counsel their clients to determine how the settlement funds would be
divided is not actionable, the court agrees with Judge Lindsay and declines to
dismiss that aspect of the legal malpractice counterclaim.101

The Frank opinion further indicates the court believed informed consent
language based on the Model Rules is shaping the law of legal malpractice
broadly. The court wrote:
Khavinson’s objection to Judge Lindsay’s consideration of the aggregate
settlement rule misses the mark. Khavinson suggests that the rule is irrelevant
to the evaluation of whether he behaved negligently because he is not a
member of the Florida Bar and did not seek [pro hac vice] admission . . . in
connection with the underlying litigation. However, as the Settling Parties
point out, the Bars of many other states, including New York, have
substantially identical rules. Thus, regardless of which jurisdiction’s rule
applied to Khavinson, he cannot establish that the substance of the aggregate
settlement rule was irrelevant to the standards of professional conduct that
governed his behavior. . . . [T]he court finds that the counter-defendants’
compliance with the aggregate settlement rule is relevant evidence regarding
their alleged negligence . . . .102

In Jones v. ABC Insurance Co.,103 a Louisiana appellate court appeared to
have no doubt that a legal malpractice claim could be grounded in the
“informed consent” language of Louisiana’s versions of Model Rule 1.8

101. Frank, 2020 WL 7022317, at *14 (first alteration in original) (first omission in original)
(citations omitted).
102. Id. at *16 (citations omitted).
103. Jones v. ABC Ins. Co., 249 So. 3d 310 (La. Ct. App. 2018).
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(dealing with aggregate settlements) and Model Rule 1.4 (dealing with
communication). The court wrote:
Rule 1.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct requires that an attorney give a
client sufficient information to participate intelligently in decisions concerning
the objectives of the representation. A legal malpractice claim for failure to
obtain informed consent, therefore, is based upon allegations that the attorney
failed to properly communicate sufficient information to the client in order
that the client can make an intelligent decision concerning the objectives of
the representation. The issue of lack of informed consent therefore raises the
question of with whom Mr. Roth had a duty to communicate regarding the
settlement of Haley’s lawsuit.104

The Jones court answered that question adverse to the plaintiff because
the lawyer who was first hired to represent the interests of an unemancipated
child in a personal injury suit had been discharged by the plaintiff’s mother,
who subsequently hired another lawyer who represented the child’s interests
at the time of settlement.105
2.

The Former Client Conflict of Interest Rule

Today, cases readily adopt the informed consent language of the Model
Rules, or the relevant state variation, as defining the standard of care in legal
malpractice actions. For example, in Abreu v. Mackiewicz,106 a legal
malpractice action, a New Jersey appellate court reviewed a no cause
judgment after a jury trial. In affirming the judgment, the court wrote:
After informing the jury that RPC 1.7 [the current client conflict of interest
rule] did not apply, but RPC 1.9 [the former client conflict of interest rule]
did, the court recited RPC 1.9(a), which states: “A lawyer who has represented
a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another client in the same or
a substantially related matter in which that client’s interests are materially
adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client gives
informed consent confirmed in writing.”
The court instructed,
“Now . . . that’s the duty that Mr. Mackiewicz had. Whether he breached that

104. Id. at 319.
105. Id. at 320.
106. Abreu v. Mackiewicz, No. A-2828-09T3, 2012 WL 6027701 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
Dec. 5, 2012).
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duty involves an assessment of the facts which you have to decide.” The court
proceeded to . . . explain what constituted “informed consent.”107

The appellate court held it was not reversible error for the trial judge to
distribute to the jury a written copy of New Jersey’s version of Model
Rule 1.9 (and its informed consent requirements) because “[t]he distribution
of the rule was designed to avoid confusion, and was not likely to lead to
overemphasis on the rule.”108
In Annie Sloan Interiors, Ltd. v. Kappel,109 Annie Sloan Interiors (ASI)
alleged that an attorney, Kappel, breached his fiduciary duties and
committed legal malpractice “by representing Jolie Design & Decor, Inc.
(“JDD”) and Jolie Home, LLC (“Jolie Home”) in an attack on the CHALK
PAINT® trademark” despite the fact that “he had previously represented
ASI in registering and defending the trademark.”110 In denying the
defendant’s motion to dismiss, a federal court in Louisiana relied in part on
the informed consent language of a Louisiana former client conflict of
interest rule patterned on ABA Model Rule 1.9.111 The court wrote:
The Louisiana State Bar Association’s Rules of Professional Conduct (“RPC”)
“have the force and effect of substantive law.”
....
By its terms, the duty of loyalty codified in RPC 1.9 applies to former
representation, and thus survives termination of the representation.
Accordingly, the 2015 termination letter, if effective, is irrelevant to the breach
of fiduciary duty claim based upon Kappel’s former representation. Second,
no breach of confidentiality is required to bring a claim under RPC 1.9(a). All
that is required is that the new client’s interests be adverse to the original
client’s interests in a substantially related matter, and that the original client
did not provide informed consent to the new representation.

107. Id. at *10 (first omission in original).
108. Id. at *13.
109. Annie Sloan Interiors, Ltd. v. Kappel, No. 19-807, 2019 WL 2492303 (E.D. La. June 14,
2019).
110. Id. at *1.
111. Model Rule 1.9 provides in relevant part: “(a) A lawyer who has formerly represented a
client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related
matter in which that person’s interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless
the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
R. 1.9 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
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Defendants argue that ASI provided informed consent to Kappel’s later
representation of JDD and Jolie Home, because ASI executed a conflict
waiver at the time Kappel took on the representation. However, while a
conflict waiver was executed waiving the conflict with Kappel with respect to
representation of ASI and JDD, no waiver was executed waiving a conflict
with respect to Kappel’s subsequent representation of Jolie Home. Therefore,
the waiver does not constitute informed consent to Kappel’s representation of
Jolie Home.
....
In sum, ASI’s argument is straightforward: it alleges that Kappel breached
a duty of loyalty by using knowledge gained during his representation of ASI
to assist a different client in a challenge to its mark, and that its damages
consist of the money expended in defending the mark and any resulting
diminution in the value of the mark. The claim is plausible on its face, and
under the facts pleaded, the court could “draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” and thus the claim can
withstand a 12(b)(6) challenge.112

The court’s three quoted references to informed consent leave little doubt
it believed informed consent was an essential touchstone in determining
whether there was a breach of fiduciary duty based on an alleged former
client conflict of interest. In addition, the court found that in the absence
of “informed consent to Kappel’s representation of Jolie Home,” a claim
for breach of fiduciary duty was “plausible on its face.”113
3.

The Current Client Conflict of Interest Rule

The informed consent requirements imposed by the current client
conflict of interest provisions of the Model Rules, and by state variations,114

112. Kappel, 2019 WL 2492303, at *2–3 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
113. Id. at 3.
114. See England v. Feldman, No. 11 Civ. 1396(CM), 2011 WL 1239775, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 28, 2011) (refusing to dismiss a legal malpractice claim based on negligence because the
defendant’s alleged violation of the informed consent requirements for joint representation set down
in the state’s disciplinary rules tended to show the defendant’s conduct fell below the standard of care);
see also Flycell, Inc. v. Schlossberg LLC, No. 11-CV-0915-CM, 2011 WL 5130159, at *7 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 28, 2011) (discussing a malpractice claim alleging “[d]efendants ignored their duties to investigate
conflicts of interest associated with their dual representation and seek [p]laintiff’s informed consent”);
Frias Holding Co. v. Greenberg Traurig, LLP, No. 2:11-cv-160-GMN-VCF, 2012 WL 4490855, at *7
(D. Nev. Sept. 27, 2012) (discussing “a plausible [legal malpractice] claim that [d]efendants failed to
obtain [p]laintiffs’ informed consent to [a] conflict”).
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are readily recognized in legal malpractice actions for damages115 and
related litigation, such as claims for disgorgement116 or unpaid attorney’s
fees.117 Ordinarily, “[a] proper conflict waiver requires the client’s
‘informed written consent,’ meaning the attorney must tell the client about
all the relevant circumstances and material risks, including any actual and
reasonably foreseeable adverse consequences from the representation.”118
The Restatement is even more specific:
In a multiple-client situation, the information normally should address the
interests of the lawyer and other client giving rise to the conflict; contingent,

115. For example, in Rivera v. Estate of Ruiz, a federal court in New York wrote:
In an action for legal malpractice where a plaintiff alleges that her attorney had a conflict of
interest, “the client must demonstrate that (1) a conflict existed and (2) that [she] was damaged
thereby.” . . . If such a conflict exists, Rule 1.7(b) states that, in order [for a lawyer] to represent
parties with conflicting interests, . . . “each affected client” must give “informed consent,
confirmed in writing.”
Rivera v. Est. of Ruiz, No. 16 Civ. 7328 (ER), 2020 WL 1503663, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2020) (first
alteration in original) (citation omitted). See Scott v. Chuhak & Tecson, P.C., No. 09 C 6858,
2011 WL 4462915, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 2011) (alterations in original) (“Rules 1.4 and 1.7, which
require a lawyer to obtain informed consent from a client when ‘there is a significant risk that the
[lawyer’s] representation of [the client] will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to
another client,’ are the embodiment of the duty of ‘undivided fidelity’ that lawyers, as a matter of law,
owe to their clients.”); Stanley v. Richmond, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 768, 774, 776 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (finding
claims for professional negligence and breach of fiduciary duty in an action involving failure to obtain
informed written consent to a conflict of interest); LK Operating, LLC v. Collection Grp., 331 P.3d
1147, 1168 (Wash. 2014) (affirming a malpractice judgment where an attorney “violated former
RPC 1.7 by engaging in simultaneous representation of multiple clients with adverse interests without
making the necessary disclosures or receiving the clients’ informed consent”); Salvemini v. Spector,
No. A-3579-11T2, 2013 WL 6508500, at *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 13, 2013) (“The judge
instructed the jury that it could consider RPC 1.7 . . . in determining the standard of care and any
deviation from that standard.”).
116. See Rodriguez v. Disner, 688 F.3d 645, 653–55 (9th Cir. 2012) (affirming a denial of all fees
and stating that “[t]he representation of clients with conflicting interests and without informed consent
is a particularly egregious ethical violation that may be a proper basis for complete denial of fees”);
Giannini, Chin & Valinoti v. Super. Ct. of San Francisco, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 394, 405, 407 (Cal. Ct. App.
1995) (recognizing, in a malpractice action seeking fee disgorgement, the “attorneys’ duties to obtain
informed consent before engaging [in] representing a client in the face of a potential conflict of
interest[,]” and holding summary judgment was improperly granted to the defendant-lawyer).
117. See Brown Rudnick, LLP v. Surgical Orthomedics, Inc., No. 13-CV-4348 (JMF),
2014 WL 3439620, at *5, 9 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2014) (quoting the informed consent requirements set
down by New York’s current-client conflict of interest rule in the context of malpractice claims asserted
incidental to a fee dispute).
118. Michael S. Leboff, Increase Collections and Avoid Costly Fee Disputes: Nine Practical Tips,
62 ORANGE CNTY. LAW. 37, 37–38 (2020).

392

ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS [Vol. 11:362

optional, and tactical considerations and alternative courses of action that
would be foreclosed or made less readily available by the conflict; the effect
of the representation or the process of obtaining other clients’ informed
consent upon confidential information of the client; any material reservations
that a disinterested lawyer might reasonably harbor about the arrangement if
such a lawyer were representing only the client being advised; and the
consequences and effects of a future withdrawal of consent by any client,
including, if relevant, the fact that the lawyer would withdraw from
representing all clients.119

A lawyer’s failure to obtain informed consent to a conflict will establish
that the defendant-lawyer breached a duty of care to the client, though it will
still be necessary for the plaintiff to prove that the breach caused
damages120 and that the claim is not barred by an applicable defense or
privilege.121
Sports Management Network v. Busch122 involved a claim by a race car driver
against the lawyer who represented him. One of the issues in the case was
whether a fee modification agreement was enforceable by the lawyer against
the client. As a federal court in Michigan explained:
The alleged 2013 RA [Representation Agreement] Modification is violative of
Michigan’s Rules of Professional Ethics. It required [lawyer] John Caponigro
to split his loyalty between his client and his company, between his client and
his company’s clients, and between his client and his law firm’s clients. The
Court need not rule on whether all these conflicts were even waivable, because
no one ever asked Busch for informed consent. Knowledge[] that one’s
attorney represents adverse parties is no substitute for a candid explanation of
why such conflicts may impair the quality of the attorney’s representation, and
why retaining outside counsel is advisable. Though an agent’s connection to
racing teams may be exactly what attracts drivers to seek his or her
representation, when the agent is also providing legal services he or she must
be sure that the driver understands what he or she is giving up by becoming a
client of his boss’s attorney.

119. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE L. GOVERNING LAWS. § 122 cmt. c(i) (AM. L. INST.
2000) (citation omitted).
120. See Fortney & Johnson, Legal Malpractice, supra note 1, § 5-2.3, at 772 (discussing factual and
proximate causation); id. § 5-5.1, at 851 (discussing compensatory damages).
121. See id. § 5-6.1, at 867 (discussing defenses and obstacles to recovery).
122. Sports Mgmt. Network v. Busch, No. 17-10413, 2019 WL 1057314 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 6,
2019).
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Because SMN and FCWS failed to provide his client with a meaningful
choice on whether such conflicts were permissible, they will not be able to
enforce their 2013 RA Modification. This does not mean that their
representation actually caused injury, however. Having reviewed the record,
the Court finds that Busch has not advanced sufficient evidence of damages
to bring the case to a jury.123

In the case of In re Concepts America, Inc.,124 the complaint contained “a
single count for legal malpractice[,]” which alleged that the defendants had
breached their duties to the plaintiffs by, among other things, “advising
Greenfield to ‘restructure’ operations so that successor entities and Plaintiffs
were subjected to claims of fraud and fraudulent transfer,” and “failing to
properly advise Greenfield of the conflict of interest and his right to
independent counsel[.]”125 The United States Bankruptcy Court sitting in
Illinois found that:
“[The plaintiff’s] allegations clearly invoke[d] Defendants’ obligations under
Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.4(b), to provide necessary
information to a client, and Rule 1.7(b), to obtain informed consent when the
lawyer’s personal interests pose a significant risk of materially limiting the
representation.”126

However, the court found the plaintiffs’ pleadings to be deficient. It
wrote: “If Plaintiffs wish to allege that RSP Defendants breached its duty of
care by failing to provide necessary information and to obtain informed
consent, Plaintiffs must amend their complaint to allege sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief.”127 The plaintiffs were
granted leave to amend their complaint.128
4.

The Business Transaction Conflict of Interest Rule

In Robinson-Podoll v. Harmelink, Fox & Ravnsborg Law Office,129 a legal
malpractice action, one of the questions was whether an attorney breached
123.
124.
2020).
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at *11.
In re Concepts Am., Inc., No. 14 B 34232, 2020 WL 6929249 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Aug. 17,
Id. at *3–4.
Id. at *7.
Id. at *8.
Id. at *10.
Robinson-Podoll v. Harmelink, Fox & Ravnsborg L. Off., 939 N.W.2d 32 (S.D. 2020).
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her professional duties to a client, by taking an anniversary ring as collateral
for a $3,800.00 loan and continuing to hold the ring without returning it to
the client.130 Discussing relevant authority, the Supreme Court of South
Dakota wrote:
Rule of Professional Responsibility 1.8 prohibits a lawyer from knowingly
acquiring “an ownership, possessory security or other pecuniary interest
adverse to the client unless:” the attorney satisfies three stated requirements,
including a written disclosure by the attorney for the client to seek
independent legal advice and a written and signed informed consent by the
client. We discussed in Behrens, 2005 S.D. 79, ¶ 51, 698 N.W.2d at 576, that
Rule 1.8, regarding conflict of interests, may support a separate tort duty.131

Thus, the Robinson-Podoll court clearly signaled that the informed consent
provisions of the disciplinary rule regulating business transactions between
lawyers and clients may set the standard of care for a malpractice action.
Other recent cases have reached similar conclusions. For example, in Sin
Ho Nam v. Quichocho,132 an “exotic island real estate contract dispute
between a Saipan lawyer lessor . . . and a Korean businessman,”133 the
client/lessee asserted a breach of fiduciary duty claim “against the attorneylessor, with whom the lessee believed that he had an attorney-client
relationship.”134 The federal District Court for the Northern Mariana
Islands quoted the provisions of Model Rule 1.8, which govern business
transactions between lawyers and clients.135 The court denied the
defendant attorney-lessor’s motion for summary judgment, stating:
[T]he greatest uncertainty is whether Nam [the lessee and putative client] gave
informed consent not just to the terms of the transaction, but to [attorneylessor] Quichocho’s “role in the transaction, including whether the lawyer is
representing the client in the transaction.”136

130. Id. at 37.
131. Id. at 48 n.11.
132. Sin Ho Nam v. Quichocho, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1152 (D. N. Mar. I. 2011).
133. Id. at 1154.
134. Id.
135. See id. at 1178 (alteration in original) (questioning whether Quichocho “fully disclosed and
transmitted the terms of the transaction ‘in a manner that can be reasonably understood by [Nam]’”).
136. Id.
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The Confidentiality Rule

St. John Haney v. Kavoukjian137 involved professional negligence and
breach of fiduciary duty claims that arose from estate planning work.
[The] Plaintiffs allege[d] Defendant Kavoukjian breached professional and
fiduciary duties owed to Muriel Farr when he sent an email in 2016 to a thirdparty that allegedly represented the Farr Claimants and divulged confidential
information obtained during his representation of Muriel Farr.138

A federal court in South Carolina recognized the potential relevance of
informed consent principles by stating:
Plaintiffs’ claims implicate duties that arise out of a fiduciary relationship. . . .
South Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct (“RPC”), Rule 1.6 states that
lawyers owe a duty of confidentiality to their clients and “(a) shall not reveal
information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives
informed consent, or the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry
out the representation, or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b).[”]
....
Plaintiffs’ claims also implicate a lawyer’s duty of loyalty owed to clients.
The RPC generally prohibits lawyers from revealing information related to a
lawyer’s prior representation of a former client. Rule 1.9 reads in pertinent
part:
“(a) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related
matter in which that person’s interests are materially adverse to the interests
of the former client unless the former client gives informed consent
confirmed in writing . . . .”139

However, the judge concluded that, on the facts in the case, it was
“premature for the Court to determine which duties Defendants owed
Muriel Farr and whether Defendants breached any duty or deviated from
any standard of care.”140

137.
2020).
138.
139.
140.

St. John Haney v. Kavoukjian, No. 2:19-cv-2098-RMG, 2020 WL 2092490 (D.S.C. May 1,
Id. at *1.
Id. at *3. (third omission in original) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
Id. at *5.
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In Parkinson v. Bevis,141 the Supreme Court of Idaho addressed a breach
of fiduciary duty claim based on breach of confidentiality. The court
allowed an equitable fee forfeiture claim to go forward because there were
sufficient facts alleging (attorney) Bevis “breached his fiduciary duty to
Parkinson by forwarding an email without her informed consent,” even if
the breach was the result of negligent acts.142
B. Cases Using the Term “Informed Consent” But Not Citing Ethics Rules
The language of informed consent increasingly appears in legal
malpractice cases even when there is no direct link to similar language in the
Model Rules or state ethics codes.143 For example, Atlanta Channel, Inc. v.
Solomon144 involved “legal malpractice claims stemming from a [lawyer’s]
failure to completely fill out a form sent to the Federal Communications
Commission” on behalf of a client, ACI.145 The lawyer (Solomon) then
moved to a different law firm—the Garvey Firm—where a Ms. Virtue
allegedly “took over ACI’s attempt to remedy the effects of the incomplete
submission, [and] failed to fulfill several ‘obligations’ she owed to
ACI . . . .”146
In the malpractice action, “ACI argue[d] that Ms. Virtue should have
alerted ACI that Mr. Solomon had committed malpractice by failing to
141. Parkinson v. Bevis, 448 P.3d 1027 (Idaho 2019).
142. Id. at 1027, 1037.
143. See Friedman v. Kahn, No. 1-12-0881, 2013 IL App (1st) 120881-U, ¶¶ 51–54 (Ill. App.
Ct. Dec. 27, 2013) (discussing informed consent in legal malpractice and medical malpractice.); Peters
v. Hyatt Legal Servs., 469 S.E.2d 481, 484 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (stating “Hyatt represented adverse
parties in a divorce proceeding without obtaining the informed consent of both,” in terms that echoed,
but did not cite, the informed consent requirements of Model Rule 1.7 or state variations); Walden v.
Hoke, 429 S.E.2d 504, 509–10 (W. Va. 1993) (stating “it is improper for a lawyer to represent both the
husband and the wife at any stage of the separation and divorce proceeding, even with full disclosure
and informed consent[,]” but finding a legal malpractice action was properly dismissed because “no
evidence was presented showing that the [lawyer’s] preparation of the answer prejudiced the
[plaintiff]”).
In O’Neal v. Agee, a husband and wife sued their lawyers for legal malpractice arising from their
simultaneous representation of the husband’s personal injury claims and the wife’s loss of consortium
claim arising from an auto accident. O’Neal v. Agee, 8 S.W.3d 238, 240–41 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999). In
the action, the plaintiffs alleged that “Ms. Agee [a lawyer] was negligent in having them execute general
releases, which had the legal effect of releasing drivers # 2 and # 4, without plaintiffs’ informed
consent.” Id.
144. Atlanta Channel, Inc. v. Solomon, No. 15-1823 (RC), 2020 WL 4219757 (D.D.C. July 23,
2020).
145. Id. at *1.
146. Id.
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complete the form, that the statute of limitations was running on that claim,
that the Garvey Firm had a potential conflict of interest, and that ACI
should consult with independent counsel.”147 As stated by a federal court
in the District of Columbia, “ACI argues that Ms. Virtue ‘failed to obtain
ACI’s fully informed consent to her assumption of responsibility for and
working on the FCC Proceeding and Appeal.’”148 Without expressly
addressing the informed consent claim, the court ruled it would “not declare
as a matter of law that Ms. Virtue did not owe her client, ACI, a duty
resembling the ‘obligations’ ACI claims were required.”149
Similarly, in D&S Remodeling, LLC v. Pinciaro,150 a plaintiff asserting a
legal malpractice claim made three references to informed consent, none of
them relating to a provision in the Model Rules or a state ethics code that
requires informed consent. According to the Connecticut Superior Court,
the plaintiff alleged:
The defendants agreed to provide the plaintiff with legal representation on a
number of cases . . . . The defendants settled Mariani without the plaintiff’s
informed consent, and the plaintiff neither consented to the payment of sums
to the Mariani plaintiffs, nor waived its claims against the Mariani plaintiffs.
The defendants also filed a withdrawal of action in ADC, which was granted
by the court on the same day, without the plaintiff’s informed consent. . . .
The defendants breached the applicable standard of care owed to the plaintiff
in that they failed to abide by the plaintiff’s wishes and instructions and obtain
the plaintiff’s informed consent regarding Mariani and ADC . . . .151

However, the court did not rule on the informed consent claims.
1.

Arbitration Provisions

There is no provision in the Model Rules that expressly conditions the
validity of an arbitration provision in a lawyer-client contract on informed
consent from the client. Nevertheless, in Castillo v. Arrieta,152 a New Mexico
appellate court found that informed consent was the appropriate standard
for determining whether an arbitration provision was valid, stating:
147. Id.
148. Id. at *3.
149. Id. at *2.
150. D&S Remodeling, LLC v. Pinciaro, 66 Conn. L. Rptr. 369 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 17, 2018)
(No. FSTCV1616029768), 2018 WL 2422903, at *1.
151. Id. at *1.
152. Castillo v. Arrieta, 368 P.3d 1249 (N.M. Ct. App. 2016).
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We conclude that if an attorney is going to require his client, within the
context of their relationship of trust, to waive the right to a jury trial for a
future malpractice dispute, such a waiver should be made knowingly with the
client’s informed consent. “[F]or the purpose of obtaining informed consent,
adequate communication will ordinarily include disclosure of the facts and
circumstances giving rise to the situation, any explanation reasonably
necessary to inform the client or other person of the material advantages and
disadvantages of the proposed course of conduct and a discussion of the
client’s or other person’s options and alternatives.” At a minimum, the
attorney should inform his client that arbitration will constitute a waiver of
important rights, including, the right to a jury trial, potentially the right to
broad discovery, and the right to an appeal on the merits.153

The Castillo court justified the application of an informed consent
standard by reference to an “attorney’s fiduciary duties of ‘candor and
loyalty in all dealings with a client[,]’”154 and to the Model Rule on
communication which requires a lawyer to “explain a matter to the extent
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions
regarding the representation.”155
Other courts have reached similar conclusions. For example, in Snow v.
Bernstein, Shur, Sawyer & Nelson, P.A.,156 the Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine held that “Maine attorneys must obtain a client’s informed consent
regarding the scope and effect of any contractual provision that
153. Id. at 1257 (alteration in original) (citation omitted); see also ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro.
Resp., Formal Op. 02-425, at 1 (2002) (“It is permissible under the Model Rules to include in a retainer
agreement with a client a provision that requires the binding arbitration of disputes concerning fees
and malpractice claims, provided that the client has been fully apprised of the advantages and
disadvantages of arbitration and has given her informed consent to the inclusion of the arbitration
provision in the retainer agreement.”).
154. Castillo, 368 P.3d at 1256 (alteration in original).
155. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020); see Castillo, 368 P.3d
at 1257 (quoting the New Mexico Rules of Professional Conduct, which are “identical to Model
Rule 1.4(b)”).
156. Snow v. Bernstein, Shur, Sawyer & Nelson, P.A., 176 A.3d 729 (Me. 2017).
The Maine Rules of Professional Conduct do not explicitly address the issue presented by this
appeal: if, and to what extent, an attorney or law firm must inform a prospective client about the
effect of a provision that prospectively requires the client to submit malpractice claims against
that attorney or firm to arbitration. However, interpretations of the Rules by both the Maine
Professional Ethics Commission and the ABA, expressed in advisory opinions, indicate that for
such a provision to comply with the Rules, the client must be fully informed of its scope and
effect.
Id. at 735.
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prospectively requires the client to submit malpractice claims against those
attorneys to arbitration.”157 The opinion of the court used the phrase
“informed consent” seventeen times, which, in light of the court’s holding,
clearly suggests the importance of informed consent principles in the law of
lawyering.
While the Snow court noted that a comment in the Maine Rules of
Professional Conduct, similar to language in the Model Rules,158 “provides
that an attorney may permissibly enter into an agreement to prospectively
submit malpractice claims to arbitration if ‘the client is fully informed of the
scope and effect of the agreement[,]’”159 it rested its decision on a broader
body of law. It stated that conditioning the enforceability of an arbitration
provision on informed consent “is based on the long-standing principle that
attorneys owe a fiduciary duty of ‘undivided loyalty’ to their clients, a duty that is
derived from the common law and that ‘predate[s] and exist[s] despite
independent, codified ethical standards.’”160 The court added:
[T]his obligation is rooted in principles unrelated to arbitration in particular
and applies to situations that go beyond arbitration: namely, that as a general
matter, an attorney—who stands as a fiduciary to his client—should fully
inform that client as to the scope and effect of her decision to waive significant
rights.161

Other courts have reached different results on similar facts.162 For
example, in Innovative Images, LLC v. Summerville,163 the Supreme Court of
Georgia upheld the enforceability of a provision requiring arbitration of
legal malpractice claims “without deciding whether GRPC [Georgia Rules
157. Id. at 737.
158. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8 cmt. 17 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (stating a
lawyer and client may be able to “enter[] into an agreement . . . to arbitrate legal malpractice claims,
provided such agreements are enforceable and the client is fully informed of the scope and effect of
the agreement”).
159. Snow, 176 A.3d at 736 (quoting ME. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8 cmt. 14).
160. Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Sargent v. Buckley, 697 A.2d 1272,
1275 (Me. 1997)).
161. Id. at 739.
162. See, e.g., Andrew Grossman, Venerable Grp. v. McAfee & Taft, No. CIV-10-853-M,
2011 WL 463035, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 4, 2011) (“Although plaintiffs allege that the Engagement
Agreement lacked informed consent, the Court finds that plaintiffs have cited no legitimate authority
to support the contention that arbitration [of a legal malpractice claim] can be avoided on these
grounds.”).
163. Innovative Images, LLC v. Summerville, 848 S.E.2d 75 (Ga. 2020).
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of Professional Conduct] Rule 1.4 (b) prohibits attorneys from entering into
agreements requiring arbitration of legal malpractice claims without their
prospective clients’ informed consent.”164
2.

Bad Business Advice

Estate of West by West v. Domina Law Group165 was a legal malpractice
lawsuit alleging a claim of negligence. The action arose out of the
defendants’ “allegedly incomplete or incorrect legal advice to Doug West
(West) regarding his options to resolve his corporation’s deadlock,
specifically the possible consequences of West’s decision to request that an
Iowa state court dissolve his corporation.”166 In the malpractice action,
West’s estate argued:
Defendants had a duty to fully inform West of all relevant aspects of filing for
dissolution, including that Finken could elect to purchase West’s shares and
that Finken’s [e]lection prevented West from withdrawing his petition for
dissolution, accepting his brother’s alleged offer to buy WMA, or
retiring/withdrawing from WMA. The Estate asserts that Defendants
recommended dissolution, but never informed West that Finken’s election
would foreclose his Buy-Sell Agreement options before West filed for
dissolution. The Estate also asserts that Defendants misinformed West about
his options. The Estate asserts that Defendants’ actions and communications
with West before, during, and after the valuation proceedings indicate that
they did not fully understand the consequences of dissolution.167

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa
allowed the negligence claim to go forward because the evidence was in
dispute. There was no discussion of any provisions in the Model Rules or
the Iowa ethics code, but the court clearly recognized that the case was
alleging negligence liability based on lack of informed consent because when
it addressed the issue of causation, it wrote:
To prove this element, the Estate must show that a reasonable person would
have taken an alternative path towards ending his business arrangement with
Finken, if Defendants had fully informed him of the consequences of
164. Id. at 79, 84.
165. Est. of West by West v. Domina L. Grp., No. 1:16-cv-30-HCA, 2018 WL 3454904 (S.D.
Iowa May 1, 2018).
166. Id. at *1.
167. Id. at *7.
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dissolution. The parties, along with the Court, agree that the informed
consent standard is an objective one.168

In a footnote, the court added:
The Iowa Supreme Court uses an objective causation standard when it
analyzes informed consent in a medical context. See Pauscher v. Iowa Methodist
Med. Ctr., 408 N.W.2d 355, 360 (Iowa 1987). The Court finds that, in the
context of an informed consent legal malpractice case, an objective standard
is appropriate as well.169

3.

Bad Litigation Advice

In Hermansen v. Riebandt,170 the plaintiffs brought a legal malpractice
action against attorneys (Riebandt, DeWald, and Ottenheimer) and their law
firms, alleging that the “defendants failed to properly inform [the clients] of
the risks of litigating the propriety of a mortgage lien on their
residence . . . .”171 The Illinois Appellate Court held that genuine issues of
fact precluded summary judgment for the defendants. Discussing the
plaintiffs’ allegations, the court wrote:
The count against Riebandt alleged that he was negligent in . . . (3) failing to
obtain plaintiffs’ informed consent prior to signing the Fidelity indemnity
agreement, which resulted in the entirety of the net proceeds from the sale of
their personal residence being held in escrow; (4) failing to inform plaintiffs
of the risks of proceeding to litigation against Bank of America, including the
rejection of multiple settlement offers . . . . The count against DeWald
contained similar allegations. The count against Ottenheimer contained
similar allegations as to Ottenheimer’s failure to inform plaintiffs of the risks
of pursuing litigation against Bank of America and also alleged that
Ottenheimer negligently advised plaintiffs as to the effect of the bankruptcy
on their obligations to Bank of America.172

Addressing the facts of the case, the court further explained:

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at *10.
Id. at *10 n.11.
Hermansen v. Riebandt, No. 1-19-1735, 2020 IL App (1st) 191735 (Nov. 25, 2020).
Id. ¶ 1.
Id. ¶ 27.
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[P]laintiffs have provided the testimony of an expert who has opined that it
was not reasonable for defendants to fail to obtain plaintiffs’ informed
consent in the instant litigation. Specifically, Robinson identified a number of
instances during their representation when defendants failed to disclose
information to plaintiffs that was necessary to enable them to make informed
decisions. First, in 2011, when Riebandt discovered that the mortgage lien
had been discovered but failed to inform plaintiffs or to counsel them as to
the risk of inaction. Second, when defendants began their attempts to remove
the lien and Riebandt and DeWald failed to inform plaintiffs that they had an
interest in resolving the issue in a way that did not reflect negatively on
Riebandt. Third, when Ottenheimer failed to inform plaintiffs that he had
overlooked the presence of the mortgage lien when handling their bankruptcy.
Fourth, when Riebandt and DeWald failed to disclose Riebandt’s relationship
with Fidelity, leading plaintiffs to believe that Riebandt was acting with
undivided loyalty in signing the indemnity agreement. Fifth, when defendants
advised plaintiffs to reject two settlement offers without informing them of
the risks of loss, their exposure in the event of loss, the limits to their recovery
if they won, and the length of time it would take to litigate. Thus, plaintiffs
have provided evidence that defendants did not exercise a reasonable degree
of care or skill in representing plaintiffs. Ottenheimer also presented the
report of an expert, Flaxman, who opined that Ottenheimer’s conduct in
addressing the lien did not violate the standard of care. While we note that
Flaxman’s report did not address Robinson’s contention that Ottenheimer
violated the standard of care by failing to inform plaintiffs of the risks of their
course of conduct, at a minimum, there is a question of fact as to the propriety
of defendants’ conduct. In the presence of this question of fact, we cannot
find that summary judgment on this basis is appropriate.173

The Hermansen court did not rely upon provisions in the Model Rules or
state ethics codes that require informed consent. However, the court clearly
implied that lack of informed consent is a valid theory on which liability for
negligence can be proved.
4.

Unauthorized Litigation

In Tye v. Beausay,174 two sons of a medical malpractice plaintiff brought a
legal malpractice action against a lawyer (Beausay) who had involved them
in the medical malpractice case without their knowledge and caused them
to sign a release of their medical malpractice claims as part of the
173. Id. ¶ 100 (emphasis omitted).
174. Tye v. Beausay, 156 N.E.3d 331 (Ohio Ct. App. 2020).
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settlement.175 Upon discovering the true facts, the brothers argued that
Beausay had failed to obtain informed consent with respect to the initiation
and prosecution of the litigation, and the signing of the release.176 The
opinion of the Court of Appeals is rooted in earlier tort decisions in Ohio
and other states, including an extensive discussion of informed consent in
medical malpractice law and legal malpractice law. There is no reference to
informed consent requirements in the Model Rules or state variations
thereof. With respect to proving causation in an informed consent case, the
court wrote:
The question does arise whether an objective standard, with even some
subjective element, . . . would properly apply in legal malpractice cases that
involve informed consent.
We have not found Ohio authority extending an objective, “reasonable
person” standard to legal malpractice cases where the contention is that the
lawyer took actions without properly informing a client. The authority outside
Ohio is also virtually non-existent.177

The court concluded:
Having reviewed these authorities, or rather, the lack of authority, we cannot
find a basis for incorporating the medical malpractice standards for informed
consent, which would allow consideration of what a reasonable person would
do, as opposed to what Matthew Tye said he would do. There may be
arguments for using an objective standard as well as some subjective analysis,
but we have not been able to find such authority.178

Applying a subjective causation standard, the court barred one brother’s
informed consent claim because he admitted that even if he had been
properly informed, he would still have signed a release of his claims in the
underlying medical malpractice action.179 However, with respect to the
other brother, who was intellectually disabled, there was a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether Beausay’s actions were the proximate cause of
any harm.180
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. at 335–36.
Id. at 336.
Id. at 344.
Id. at 347.
Id. at 348.
Id.
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In Walsh v. Cunniff,181 the plaintiffs filed a legal malpractice action against
the defendant alleging he “was negligent in the underlying litigation” for
allowing certain viable defendants “to be dismissed for want of prosecution
in 2010 without the informed consent of plaintiffs . . . .”182 The Illinois
Appellate Court found the claim was barred by the statute of limitations.183
However, absent such a barrier, it is reasonable to argue that this is precisely
the type of information a client has a right to know, and which a lawyer
should be obliged to disclose without a request.
C. Cases Not Using the Term “Informed Consent” Nor Citing Ethics Rules
There are some cases that neither use the term “informed consent” nor
cite the Model Rules or state variations, that nevertheless recognize the
principles on which the doctrine of informed consent is based.184 For
example, in Bowman v. Gruel Mills Nims & Pylman, LLP,185 a malpractice
action, a federal court in Michigan concluded that regardless of whether a
lawyer’s decision not to press ERISA claims in a retirement benefit dispute
was a protected exercise of professional discretion, that choice, as a key
strategic decision, needed to be discussed with the client.186
Similarly, in Sierra Fria Corp. v. Donald J. Evans, P.C.,187 former clients
brought a legal malpractice action based on negligence, arguing that their
lawyers had failed to advise them of the dangers of proceeding with the
purchase of two hotels in Aruba without a property survey.188 After the
deal closed, the clients learned that “assets having an appraised value in
excess of $4,000,000—tennis courts, parking spaces, and an administrative
building housing the hotels’ laundry facilities—lay on land belonging to” an
adjacent business.189

181. Walsh v. Cunniff, No. 1-16-1046, 2017 IL App (1st) 161046-U (June 16, 2017).
182. Id. ¶ 7.
183. Id. ¶ 21.
184. Cf. Thomas & Wong, Gen. Contractor, Inc. v. Wallace, No. 1 CA-CV 08-0634,
2010 WL 475690, at *9 (Ariz. Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2010) (finding that a lawyer acting as an agent had “a
duty to use reasonable efforts to provide the company with material information she was aware of or
should have been aware of that could affect Thomas & Wong’s decision to enter into the loan
transaction”).
185. Bowman v. Gruel Mills Nims & Pylman, LLP, No. 5:06-CV-87, 2007 WL 1203580 (W.D.
Mich. Apr. 24, 2007).
186. Id. at *2, 5–6.
187. Sierra Fria Corp. v. Donald J. Evans, P.C., 127 F.3d 175 (1st Cir. 1997).
188. Id. at 179.
189. Id.
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Addressing the lawyers’ disclosure obligations, the First Circuit wrote:
[W]hen a client seeks advice from an attorney, the attorney owes the client “a
duty of full and fair disclosure of facts material to the client’s interests.” This
means that the attorney must advise the client of any significant legal risks
involved in a contemplated transaction, and must do so in terms sufficiently
plain to permit the client to assess both the risks and their potential impact on
his situation. Consequently, in a legal malpractice action that implicates an
attorney’s performance of his counseling function, the trier of fact must
determine whether the attorney’s advice permitted the client adequately to
weigh the risks involved in a given course of action.190

The court affirmed a judgment for the lawyers because there was ample
evidence to support the trial court’s findings that the dangers of proceeding
with the purchase had been repeatedly disclosed.191 The First Circuit wrote:
Massachusetts law requires an attorney performing a counseling function to
advise the client in a manner that permits the latter intelligently to assess the
risks of taking (or declining to take) a particular action. But lawyers—even
high-priced lawyers—ordinarily are not guarantors of favorable results. It is
neither fair, practical, nor legally appropriate to benchmark an attorney against
a standard of prescience. Thus, lawyers are not obliged to relate in exquisite
detail every fact or circumstance that might conceivably have a bearing on the
client’s business decision or to anticipate remote risks. By the same token,
lawyers are not expected to persist relentlessly when clients—especially clients
who are sophisticated businessmen—choose to go forward after being
suitably informed of looming risks. See Conklin v. Hannoch Weisman, 145 N.J.
395, 678 A.2d 1060, 1069 (1996) (stating that “an attorney has no obligation
‘to lie down in front of a speeding train’ to prevent a bad deal”).192

V. SPECIAL ISSUES
This section discusses four special issues of recurring importance: (1) the
nature of lawyers’ disclosure obligations to clients; (2) the ability of lawyers
and clients to define the scope of the representation; (3) the role of expert
testimony; and (4) the proof of factual causation.

190. Id. at 179–80 (citation omitted).
191. Id. at 184.
192. Id. at 182 (citation omitted).
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A. The Nature of Lawyers’ Disclosure Obligations to Clients
In many representations, the operative law and the relevant facts are
complex, and there is a need for a lawyer and client to agree on a course of
action. In these types of cases, it is important for a lawyer to be able to
exercise some degree of discretion and judgment in advising a client. In a
particular case, a great deal of information related to risks and alternatives
may qualify as “material,” yet relaying every piece of information with equal
emphasis would be a dubious way for a lawyer to attempt to fulfil disclosure
obligations to the client.
Some judicial opinions discussing disclosure obligations to clients
expansively state that lawyers owe clients a duty of “absolute and perfect
candor.”193 However, as I have stated on other occasions, that “cannot
possibly be an accurate statement of an attorney’s obligations” in every
situation:
[S]uch a standard would be impractical. A duty of candor that is “absolute
and perfect” would require a lawyer to convey to a client every piece of data
coming into the lawyer’s possession, no matter how duplicative, arcane,
unreliable, or insignificant. Little would be gained by imposing such an
exacting obligation, and much would be lost in terms of efficiency and
expense. If lawyers were required to be mere relayers of information and not
permitted to exercise judgment in terms of what facts to convey to clients, the
legal system would run far less smoothly than it does today. . . . [T]he essence
of good lawyering is the exercise of judgment. Arguably, evaluative discretion
must extend just as readily to communicating with clients, as to investigating
facts, examining witnesses, negotiating deals, drafting documents, or crafting
solutions.194

193. Recent cases include: Fitch v. L. Off. of Patricia Kane, No. NNHCV176068687,
2020 WL 3429142, at *22 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 18, 2020) (concerning duties arising out of a legal
relationship); Guo Wengui v. Clark Hill, PLC, 440 F. Supp. 3d 30, 36 (D.D.C. 2020) (describing the
foundations of a fiduciary relationship); Flores v. Gonzalez & Assocs. L. Firm, No. 13-15-00205-CV,
2016 WL 5845922, at *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Oct. 6, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(explaining appellants argument that the lack of such candor constituted breach of fiduciary duty); see
also Johnson, supra note 26, 753–70 (discussing cases from Texas, Oklahoma, and the District of
Columbia).
194. Johnson, supra note 26, at 739 (footnotes omitted).
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Further:
[T]he duty of “absolute and perfect candor” applies most forcefully in
instances where the interests of the attorney and client are adverse, as in the
case of a business transaction between them.
....
[In addition,] a relatively small number of areas [in] the legal profession
[have] developed [ethics] rules that call for . . . disclosure of [particular]
information. For example, in seeking to obtain an effective client waiver of a
conflict of interest, the lawyer must disclose the existence, nature,
implications, and possible adverse consequences of the conflict. In dealing
with client property, a lawyer must promptly notify a client of its receipt. In
entering into an agreement for legal services with a new client, the lawyer must
disclose the basis or rate of the fee. And upon receiving a settlement offer, a
lawyer ordinarily must communicate the offer to the client promptly. . . .
[W]here specific rules of conduct have crystalized, attorneys are [sometimes]
faced with demanding disclosure obligations.
However, outside of these limited contexts, the disclosure obligations of
attorneys are more properly described by the rule of negligence . . . .195

Some scholars anchor the disclosure obligations that are at the heart of
the informed consent doctrine in the law of fiduciary duty, rather than the
negligence principles of tort law. Thus, legal malpractice expert Ronald E.
Mallen writes:
A corollary of the fiduciary obligations of undivided loyalty and confidentiality
is the attorney’s responsibility to promptly advise the client of any important
information that may impinge on those obligations. This means that there
must be complete disclosure of all information that may bear on the quality
of the attorney’s representation. The disclosure must include not only all
material facts but also should include an explanation of their legal
significance.196

However, even if the analysis is framed in terms of breach of fiduciary
duty (disloyalty) rather than negligence (lack of care), the necessity of

195. Id. at 771, 774–75 (footnotes omitted).
196. 2 RONALD E. MALLEN, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 15:26 (2021 ed.) (footnotes omitted).

408

ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS [Vol. 11:362

proving that the breach of fiduciary duty was culpable inevitably returns to
the touchstone of negligence:197
Breach of fiduciary duty is not a strict liability tort. A plaintiff alleging
fiduciary breach must show that the defendant-lawyer acted negligently,
recklessly, or intentionally in violating fiduciary principles. Absent proof of
culpability, there is no liability for breach of fiduciary duty.198

Thus, the Restatement says “[a] lawyer who has acted with reasonable care
is not liable in damages for breach of fiduciary duty.”199
Consequently, as the foregoing discussion suggests, in deciding whether
a lawyer has acted in accordance with the informed consent disclosure
obligations imposed by the law of negligence and the law of fiduciary duty,
it is necessary to consider whether the lawyer’s obligations are governed
(1) by the usual obligation of reasonable care,200 (2) heightened standards
articulated by ethics rules or other law that sometimes require specific
disclosures (in addition to the exercise of reasonable care), or (3) an
obligation of “absolute and perfect candor” because the interests of the
lawyer and the client are adverse.
B. The Scope of the Representation
Within broad bounds, a lawyer and a client are free to define the scope of
the representation and, consequently, the duties the lawyer owes to the
client. Thus, it has long been recognized that, unless unreasonable on the
197. See Friedman v. Kahn, No. 1-12-0881, 2013 IL App (1st) 120881-U, ¶ 54 (Ill. App. Ct.
Dec. 27, 2013) (“[I]t is not true that whenever a lawyer fails to inform his client of a foreseeable risk,
the lawyer is automatically negligent. Rather, the question is whether a reasonable divorce attorney
would have informed his client of such a risk in similar circumstances.”).
198. Fortney & Johnson, Legal Malpractice, supra note 1, § 5-3.1(d), at 791.
199. Johnson, supra note 26, at 776 (alteration in original) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE L. GOVERNING LAWS. § 49 cmt. d (AM. L. INST. 2000)).
200. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE L. GOVERNING LAWS. § 20 (AM. L. INST. 2000).
Section 20 provides:
(1) A lawyer must keep a client reasonably informed about the matter and must consult with a client
to a reasonable extent concerning decisions to be made by the lawyer under §§ 21–23.
(2) A lawyer must promptly comply with a client’s reasonable requests for information.
(3) A lawyer must notify a client of decisions to be made by the client under §§ 21–23 and must
explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions
regarding the representation.
Id. (emphasis added).
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facts,201 a lawyer and a client may narrow the lawyer’s disclosure obligations
to the client.202 This is still the rule. Section 20 of the Restatement (Third) of
the Law Governing Lawyers, in discussing the communication duties of lawyers
to clients, states: “To the extent that the parties have not otherwise agreed, a standard
of reasonableness under all the circumstances determines the appropriate
measure of consultation.”203 In addition, Section 19 of the Restatement
expressly provides that: “(1) Subject to other requirements stated in this
Restatement, a client and lawyer may agree to limit a duty that a lawyer
would otherwise owe to the client if: (a) the client is adequately informed
and consents; and (b) the terms of the limitation are reasonable in the
circumstances.”204 If a sophisticated and experienced business client tells
a lawyer that he does not want any advice about the wisdom of a proposed
merger, and that the lawyer’s job is simply to draw up the documents, the
lawyer can follow those directions without fear of being sued for failure to
disclose risks related to the merger, provided that it is reasonable to believe
that the client fully understood the risks.
C. The Role of Expert Testimony
Regardless of whether a legal malpractice case based on negligent
nondisclosure does or does not use the term “informed consent,” the
analysis of whether there was a breach of duty should be governed by the
usual rules,205 which normally require the production of expert

201. See Fortney & Johnson, Legal Malpractice, supra note 1, § 5-2.1(b)(3) at 738 (discussing
“[u]nreasonable [l]imits on the [s]cope of [r]epresentation”).
202. In 1958, the Restatement (Second) of Agency stated: “The existence and extent of the duties of
the agent to the principal are determined by the terms of the agreement between the parties, interpreted
in light of the circumstances under which it is made . . . .” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 376 (AM. L. INST. 1958). Explaining that provision, the commentary to Section 376 opined:
Thus, the duties . . . of care, . . . of obedience, and . . . of loyalty . . . [as set forth in various
provisions of the Restatement] are inferences drawn from the conduct of the parties in light of
common experience and what reasonable men regard as fair. The rules stated in such Sections
are the rules applicable to the normal case, in which the parties have not made a different
agreement. . . . [T]he parties can make what agreements they please, . . . with [limited]
exceptions . . . .
Id. § 376 cmt. a.
203. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE L. GOVERNING LAWS. § 20 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 2000)
(emphasis added).
204. Id. § 19.
205. See Scott v. Chuhak & Tecson, P.C., No. 09 C 6858, 2011 WL 4462915, at *4 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 26, 2011) (“[T]he standard of care against which the attorney defendant’s conduct will be
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testimony.206 The expert ordinarily should opine on (1) whether, in the
circumstances, the nondisclosed matter was material, (2) whether the
exercise of due care required its disclosure,207 (3) whether sufficient
information was clearly disclosed to permit a client to make an informed
decision,208 and, depending on the jurisdiction, (4) whether nondisclosure
caused damages.209 Absent the benefit of expert testimony, a jury should
not be permitted to decide these matters, unless the answers would be
obvious even to a layperson. That will not often be the case. As a federal
court in California remarked: “The intricacies of the doctrine of informed
consent . . . are not . . . ‘readily apparent’ to laymen.”210

measured must generally be established through expert testimony.” (quoting Barth v. Reagan,
564 N.E.2d 1196, 1200 (Ill. 1990))).
206. Cf. Note, Restructuring Informed Consent: Legal Therapy for the Doctor-Patient Relationship,
79 YALE L.J. 1533, 1557 (1970) (“Only if there is a substantial conflict among professionals will the
question of the proper standard of conduct get resolved by the jury . . . .”).
207. See Vincent R. Johnson, Legal Malpractice in International Business Transactions, 44 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 325, 345–51 (2015) (discussing tort liability for failure to disclose material risks related to
international business transactions and offering illustrations).
208. With respect to conflicts of interest, the Restatement explains:
Informed consent requires that each affected client be aware of the material respects in which the
representation could have adverse effects on the interests of that client. The information required
depends on the nature of the conflict and the nature of the risks of the conflicted representation.
The client must be aware of information reasonably adequate to make an informed decision.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE L. GOVERNING LAWS. § 122 cmt. c(i) (AM. L. INST. 2000).
209. Whether expert testimony on causation of damages is appropriate in a legal malpractice
case is a matter of great dispute. A review of American law shows that it is sometimes permitted.
See id. § 52 cmt. g (“[A] plaintiff alleging [malpractice] ordinarily must introduce expert testimony
concerning the care reasonably required in the circumstances of the case and the lawyer’s failure to
exercise such care.”). Other times it is required. See Primis Corp. v. Milledge, No. 14-08-00753-CV,
2010 WL 2103936, at *1, *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 27, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(determining expert testimony is necessary because the “causal link between the attorney’s negligence
and the alleged damages is beyond the trier of fact’s common understanding”). While other times it is
prohibited entirely. See Leibel v. Johnson, 728 S.E.2d 554, 556 (Ga. 2012) (holding expert testimony is
not appropriate to prove proximate causation in a legal malpractice claim, but rather this would be a
task for the jury); see also Conklin v. Hannoch Weisman, 678 A.2d 1060, 1069 (N.J. 1996) (“Without
any insight into the make-up and needs of the legal malpractice plaintiff, expert testimony regarding
what a reasonably prudent client would have done under similar circumstances in weighing the risks
and complications of complex commercial business transactions appears of dubious value to the trier
of fact.”).
210. Lewellen v. Phillips, No. C062277, 2010 WL 4851362, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2010).
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D. Proof of Factual Causation
With respect to whether the nondisclosure of a material fact caused harm,
there are a range of choices for framing the inquiry into factual causation.
The jury could be asked whether, but for the nondisclosure, (1) the plaintiff
would not have consented;211 (2) a reasonable person would not have
consented;212 (3) a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position would not have
consented; or (4) both the plaintiff and a reasonable person would not have
consented. Reasonable minds can differ as to which of these inquiries
would be the most reliable guide to determining whether the nondisclosure
did, in fact, cause harm.213
However, it is important to remember that the factual causation issue
arises in two types of nondisclosure cases—cases which use the term
“informed consent” and cases which do not. In the latter group of cases—
ordinary negligence claims—it is well established that the assessment of
factual causation is essentially a subjective inquiry. The question is whether
but for the nondisclosure this particular plaintiff would have chosen a
different course and would not have suffered harm.
If that is true, there is no reason to engraft a reasonable-person
requirement onto the factual causation inquiry in the former group of cases
merely because the cases use the terminology of informed consent. Thus,
the question should be whether the particular plaintiff would not have
consented. There is little reason to think that this subjective standard for
assessing factual causation will risk the erroneous imposition of liability on
211. See Conklin, 678 A.2d at 1070 (discussing “reasons for rejecting the subjective standard of
informed consent in the medical malpractice context” and rejecting the subjective standard in the legal
malpractice context).
212. See id. at 1069 (“The objective theory of informed consent, under which the jury would be
asked to consider whether a reasonably prudent client would have entered into a business transaction
if adequately informed of its attendant risks, fails to reflect the many highly subjective, personal,
financial and strategic concerns that underlay most legal decisions and that are not present in the
majority of medical decisions. A majority of medical patients are sick and consult a doctor for a single
purpose—to get well. The patients usually bring little or no personal knowledge to the evaluation of
the risks associated with their recovery.”).
213. See id. at 1073 (“[W]e find that the objective and subjective tests for informed consent,
borrowed from the medical malpractice context, are unsuited for legal malpractice cases in which
inadequate or inaccurate advice is alleged as a concurrent cause of harm. Rather, we hold that usual
principles of negligence apply, including an analysis of foreseeability. We hold, however, that the
traditional jury charge on proximate cause as a continuous sequence is inapt for legal malpractice cases
in which there are concurrent independent causes of harm and that a jury in such cases must be
instructed to determine whether the negligence was a substantial factor in bringing about the ultimate
harm.”).
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the defendant-lawyer. The plaintiff must still adduce expert testimony that
the nondisclosed information was material, that requirements of reasonable
care necessitated its disclosure, and that adequate information was not
provided to secure informed consent. In addition, in assessing whether the
plaintiff would have chosen a different course, the jury is not obliged to
accept the plaintiff’s self-interested testimony, but can, and likely will, assess
the plaintiff’s credibility by taking into account the reasonableness of what
the plaintiff says.
Moreover, an objective test for factual causation would be inconsistent
with the principles of self-determination on which the doctrine of informed
consent is based. As the Supreme Court of Oklahoma stated in a medical
malpractice case involving lack of informed consent:
To the extent the plaintiff, given an adequate disclosure, would have declined
the proposed treatment, and a reasonable person in similar circumstances
would have consented, a patient’s right of self-determination is irrevocably
lost. This basic right to know and decide is the reason for the full-disclosure
rule. Accordingly, we decline to jeopardize this right by the imposition of the
“reasonable man” standard.214

According to practitioners, factual causation often cannot be proved in
medical malpractice cases because “the patient was suffering a lifethreatening illness or condition for which reasonable people would undergo
treatment, regardless of the risks involved.”215 Similar obstacles to recovery
may be expected in legal malpractice cases alleging lack of informed consent.
If the client had to act and had no good options, it will be hard to prove that
a different course would have been taken and a better outcome achieved.
However, in many instances, clients do not have to act or do have options.
In such cases, it may well be possible to prove that a lawyer’s failure to
disclose material information caused harm.

214. Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 559 (Okla. 1979) (emphasis omitted).
215. Thomas E. Albro & Thomas M. Hendell, What Practitioners Can Teach Academics About Tort
Litigation—the Plaintiff’s Perspective in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 13 J. TORT L. 273, 278 (2020)
(“Consent cases are generally only worth taking when the procedures involved are elective.”).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The informed consent doctrine in legal malpractice law is not a fad or an
aberration. Rather, it is the expression of a core value of American legal
ethics which holds that clients have both a right to decide important matters
related to their representation and a right to material information that bears
upon those decisions. As stated by the American Law Institute in the
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers:
When a client is to make a decision, a lawyer must bring to the client’s
attention the need for the decision to be made, unless the client has given
contrary instructions . . . . Before a client signs a contract, . . . the lawyer
ordinarily should explain its provisions. . . . The lawyer [also] ordinarily must
explain the pros and cons of reasonably available alternatives. The
appropriate detail depends on such factors as the importance of the decision,
how much advice the client wants, what the client has already learned and
considered, and the time available for deliberation.216

A lawyer’s failure to obtain informed consent from a client related to
important choices during the representation is a breach of the duty of care
that will support an action for negligence. If the client proves that but for
the nondisclosure different choices would have been made and harm would
have been avoided, it is fair to hold the lawyer liable for the losses the client
needlessly suffered.

216. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE L. GOVERNING LAWS. § 20 cmt. e (AM. L. INST. 2000)
(citation omitted).

